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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 February 2024

Matthias Thiemann
Matthias Thiemann
Affiliation:
Sciences Po Paris
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Taming the Cycles of Finance?
Central Banks and the Macro-prudential Shift in Financial Regulation
 , pp. 268 - 329
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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  • References
  • Matthias Thiemann, Sciences Po Paris
  • Book: Taming the Cycles of Finance?
  • Online publication: 15 February 2024
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009233125.012
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  • References
  • Matthias Thiemann, Sciences Po Paris
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  • References
  • Matthias Thiemann, Sciences Po Paris
  • Book: Taming the Cycles of Finance?
  • Online publication: 15 February 2024
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009233125.012
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