Spontaneity = World Soul, or the Highest Principle of Philosophy of Nature

Summary

[3] ‘What is matter other than extinguishedspirit? All duplicity is cancelled in it; its state is a state of absolute identity and of rest. In the transition from homogeneity to duplicity a world already dawns, and with the restoration of duplicity the world itself opens up, and what is this world other than visiblespirit?’

These are the profound words of Schellingin his master work: First Outline of a System of Philosophy of Nature. In them lies that ultimate problem which, instead of being solved, is so often merely put off for future work – that problem which, instead of finally resulting in an inalterable axiom, has been treated only in intermediate and provisional propositions. At the heart of [this problem] is the question of [4] the bond between natureand concept, between lawand freedom, between dead mechanismand living dynamism. We are able to divine the meaning of these words from the author's work, yet for us to grasp their fully significance, we lack the master's finishing touches.

Schellingexpresses the problemitself at the end of his conclusions on p. 254:

‘What is the universal source of activity in Nature? What cause brought forth the first dynamic juxtaposition in Nature (of which the mechanical is a mere consequence)? Or what cause first cast the seed of motion into the universal rest of Nature, duplicity into universal identity, the first spark of heterogeneity into the universal homogeneity of Nature?’

The author found himself driven to this problem after grasping the concept of nature in its highest universality and charting its descent through its essential stages – and it is at precisely the point where the author breaks off that the problem surfaces. All the conclusions of this acute work press towards the articulation of this problem – and so they must, [for] Schellingworks from an unconditioned empiricism. That is, there should be no question of the first movensof nature within [5] empiricism, for the philosopher of nature, as he encounters nature, finds it already posited in becoming, and he can do nothing more than develop the already-active principles of nature in their activity. Empiricism is therefore unconditioned only for the philosopher of nature – unconditioned, that is, only under the condition of excluding that principleof becomingimplied in Schelling's questions above, questions that can only be answered in transcendental philosophy.