Book contents
- Rejecting Compromise
- Rejecting Compromise
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Rejecting Compromise, Getting Gridlock
- 2 Legislators Reject Half-Loaf Compromises
- 3 Legislators Reject Half-Loaf Compromises Because They Fear Voter Retribution
- 4 Primary Voters as the Source of Punishment
- 5 Voter Punishment Is Rare but Real
- 6 Structuring Negotiations in the Shadow of Primary Voter Punishment
- 7 Compromise, Voter Punishment in Primaries, and Legislative Gridlock
- References
- Index
3 - Legislators Reject Half-Loaf Compromises Because They Fear Voter Retribution
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 January 2020
- Rejecting Compromise
- Rejecting Compromise
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Rejecting Compromise, Getting Gridlock
- 2 Legislators Reject Half-Loaf Compromises
- 3 Legislators Reject Half-Loaf Compromises Because They Fear Voter Retribution
- 4 Primary Voters as the Source of Punishment
- 5 Voter Punishment Is Rare but Real
- 6 Structuring Negotiations in the Shadow of Primary Voter Punishment
- 7 Compromise, Voter Punishment in Primaries, and Legislative Gridlock
- References
- Index
Summary
Why do legislators sometimes reject compromises that seem within reach and are closer to their preferred policy? Chapter 3 tests various explanations for legislators’ rejection of compromise and presents evidence that the belief that voters are very likely to punish state legislators for compromising reduces legislators’ likelihood of voting for a given compromise proposal by 21 percent. We find a similar effect among local elected officials. This demonstrates the importance of legislators’ views of their constituents and the role that fear of voter punishment plays in the rejection of compromises.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Rejecting CompromiseLegislators' Fear of Primary Voters, pp. 37 - 54Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020