Book contents
- Rejecting Compromise
- Rejecting Compromise
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Rejecting Compromise, Getting Gridlock
- 2 Legislators Reject Half-Loaf Compromises
- 3 Legislators Reject Half-Loaf Compromises Because They Fear Voter Retribution
- 4 Primary Voters as the Source of Punishment
- 5 Voter Punishment Is Rare but Real
- 6 Structuring Negotiations in the Shadow of Primary Voter Punishment
- 7 Compromise, Voter Punishment in Primaries, and Legislative Gridlock
- References
- Index
Copyright page
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 January 2020
- Rejecting Compromise
- Rejecting Compromise
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Rejecting Compromise, Getting Gridlock
- 2 Legislators Reject Half-Loaf Compromises
- 3 Legislators Reject Half-Loaf Compromises Because They Fear Voter Retribution
- 4 Primary Voters as the Source of Punishment
- 5 Voter Punishment Is Rare but Real
- 6 Structuring Negotiations in the Shadow of Primary Voter Punishment
- 7 Compromise, Voter Punishment in Primaries, and Legislative Gridlock
- References
- Index
Summary
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Rejecting CompromiseLegislators' Fear of Primary Voters, pp. ivPublisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020