Book contents
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Part I The Theoretical Foundations
- Part II Balance Sheet Operations in Different Times and CBI
- Part III The Political Economy of CBI in the Real Economy
- 7 Fiscal Needs and Low Interest Rates Policy in an Olsonian Setting
- 8 Are Central Banks Too Independent?
- 9 The Future of CBI
- References
- Index
9 - The Future of CBI
from Part III - The Political Economy of CBI in the Real Economy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 April 2024
Book contents
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Part I The Theoretical Foundations
- Part II Balance Sheet Operations in Different Times and CBI
- Part III The Political Economy of CBI in the Real Economy
- 7 Fiscal Needs and Low Interest Rates Policy in an Olsonian Setting
- 8 Are Central Banks Too Independent?
- 9 The Future of CBI
- References
- Index
Summary
In the final Chapter 9 we discuss the latest reactions of central banks to the rise of inflation, which can be interpreted as an attempt to safeguard their independence against governments. We consequently argue for a return to a division of labour in line with the Tinbergen-rule of economic policy, which can be translated as: one objective, one instrument, one agency. This shift would place much more responsibility for broader economic outcomes on the shoulders of governments, leaving central banks to tend to the narrower agenda of monetary stability.
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- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence , pp. 208 - 219Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024