Book contents
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Part I The Theoretical Foundations
- Part II Balance Sheet Operations in Different Times and CBI
- Part III The Political Economy of CBI in the Real Economy
- 7 Fiscal Needs and Low Interest Rates Policy in an Olsonian Setting
- 8 Are Central Banks Too Independent?
- 9 The Future of CBI
- References
- Index
7 - Fiscal Needs and Low Interest Rates Policy in an Olsonian Setting
from Part III - The Political Economy of CBI in the Real Economy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 April 2024
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Illustrations
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Part I The Theoretical Foundations
- Part II Balance Sheet Operations in Different Times and CBI
- Part III The Political Economy of CBI in the Real Economy
- 7 Fiscal Needs and Low Interest Rates Policy in an Olsonian Setting
- 8 Are Central Banks Too Independent?
- 9 The Future of CBI
- References
- Index
Summary
Chapter 7 takes an Olsonian perspective. We ask the question of what drove central bank balance sheet policies in democracies. This development is understood from the perspective of Mancur Olson’s ground-breaking theory of the ‘rise and decline of nations’ which accounts for the increasing difficulty to reform as distributional coalitions impose the ‘slavery of the rent-seeking society’ (as the former chief economist of the GATT, Jan Tumlir, so appropriately put it) on democratic societies. In light of these considerations, the factual degree of central bank independence might lower than it appears at first glance.
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- Reconsidering Central Bank Independence , pp. 153 - 195Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024