Book contents
- Rawls’s A Theory of Justice at 50
- Cambridge Philosophical Anniversaries
- Rawls’s A Theory of Justice at 50
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations of and Bibliographic Information for Rawls’s Works
- Introduction
- Part I Rawls and History
- Part II Developments between A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism
- Part III Rawls, Ideal Theory, and the Persistence of Injustice
- Part IV Pluralism, Democracy, and the Future of Justice as Fairness
- 14 Public Reason at Fifty
- 15 Reasonable Political Conceptions and the Well-Ordered Liberal Society
- 16 Religious Pluralism and Social Unions
- 17 One Person, at Least One Vote?
- 18 Reflections on Democracy’s Fragility
- 19 A Society of Self-Respect
- References
- Index
17 - One Person, at Least One Vote?
Rawls on Political Equality … within Limits
from Part IV - Pluralism, Democracy, and the Future of Justice as Fairness
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 July 2023
- Rawls’s A Theory of Justice at 50
- Cambridge Philosophical Anniversaries
- Rawls’s A Theory of Justice at 50
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations of and Bibliographic Information for Rawls’s Works
- Introduction
- Part I Rawls and History
- Part II Developments between A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism
- Part III Rawls, Ideal Theory, and the Persistence of Injustice
- Part IV Pluralism, Democracy, and the Future of Justice as Fairness
- 14 Public Reason at Fifty
- 15 Reasonable Political Conceptions and the Well-Ordered Liberal Society
- 16 Religious Pluralism and Social Unions
- 17 One Person, at Least One Vote?
- 18 Reflections on Democracy’s Fragility
- 19 A Society of Self-Respect
- References
- Index
Summary
The precept, “One person, one vote,” is an article of faith in contemporary democracies. Nevertheless, many theorists and philosophers—historically, John Stuart Mill, and recently. others—have advocated unequal suffrage in order to favor the input of those who would vote more wisely. Strikingly, in A Theory of Justice John Rawls says that Mill’s argument for such epistemically motivated plural voting is, “of the right form,” adding that, “plural voting may be perfectly just.” I will argue that this is deeply rooted in Rawls’s theory, not a mere curiosity. Rawls subordinates political equality to other basic liberties and his case for doing so is carefully considered. I go on to ask, inconclusively, what might be a good reply that is responsive to Rawls’s concerns – a strong case for a more absolute commitment to equal suffrage.
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- Information
- Rawls’s A Theory of Justice at 50 , pp. 296 - 312Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2023