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11 - Local Causality, Probability and Explanation

from Part III - Nonlocality: Illusion or Reality?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2016

Richard A. Healey
Affiliation:
University of Arizona
Shan Gao
Affiliation:
Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing
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Summary

Abstract

In papers published in the 25 years following his famous 1964 proof, John Bell refined and reformulated his views on locality and causality. Although his formulations of local causality were in terms of probability, he had little to say about that notion. But assumptions about probability are implicit in his arguments and conclusions. Probability does not conform to these assumptions when quantum mechanics is applied to account for the particular correlations Bell argues are locally inexplicable. This account involves no superluminal action and there is even a sense in which it is local, but it is in tension with the requirement that the direct causes and effects of events be nearby.

Introduction

I never met John Bell, but his writings have supplied me with a continual source of new insights as I read and reread them over 40 years. As I worked toward a rather different understanding of quantum mechanics he was foremost in my mind as a severe but honest critic of such attempts. We all would love to know what Einstein would have made of Bell's theorem. I confess that the deep regret I feel that Bell cannot respond to this paper is sometimes assuaged by a sense of relief.

Locality and Local Causality

In his seminal 1964 paper [1], John Bell expressed locality as the requirement

that the result of a measurement on one system be unaffected by operations on a distant system with which it has interacted in the past.

[2, p. 14]

This seems to require that the result of a measurement would have been the same, no matter what operations had been performed on such a distant system. But suppose the result of a measurement were the outcome of an indeterministic process. Then the result of the measurement might have been different even if exactly the same operations (if any) had been performed on that distant system. So can no indeterministic theory satisfy the locality requirement? Bell felt no need to address that awkward question in his 1964 paper [1], since he took the EPR argument to establish that any additional variables needed to restore locality and causalitywould have to determine a unique result of ameasurement.

Type
Chapter
Information
Quantum Nonlocality and Reality
50 Years of Bell's Theorem
, pp. 172 - 194
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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References

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