Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction: Abstract Models of Learning
- 1 Consistency and Symmetry
- 2 Bounded Rationality
- 3 Pattern Learning
- 4 Large Worlds
- 5 Radical Probabilism
- 6 Reflection
- 7 Disagreement
- 8 Consensus
- Appendix A Inductive Logic
- Appendix B Partial Exchangeability
- Appendix C Marley's Axioms
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Bibliography
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 October 2017
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- Preface and Acknowledgments
- Introduction: Abstract Models of Learning
- 1 Consistency and Symmetry
- 2 Bounded Rationality
- 3 Pattern Learning
- 4 Large Worlds
- 5 Radical Probabilism
- 6 Reflection
- 7 Disagreement
- 8 Consensus
- Appendix A Inductive Logic
- Appendix B Partial Exchangeability
- Appendix C Marley's Axioms
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
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- The Probabilistic Foundations of Rational Learning , pp. 206 - 219Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2017
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