Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures, Tables, and Boxes
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Selective Property Rights
- 3 Private Entrepreneurs in Legislative Office
- 4 Motivations to Run
- 5 Protection from Predation
- 6 Legislator Status and Political Capital
- 7 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Bibliography (with Chinese-Language References)
- Index
- Series
4 - Motivations to Run
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 August 2019
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures, Tables, and Boxes
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Selective Property Rights
- 3 Private Entrepreneurs in Legislative Office
- 4 Motivations to Run
- 5 Protection from Predation
- 6 Legislator Status and Political Capital
- 7 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Bibliography (with Chinese-Language References)
- Index
- Series
Summary
This chapter tests the first implication of the model: whether private entrepreneurs believe that being a legislator makes their property more secure. It discusses the definitions of the term "expropriation," a central concept of the book. Using interview evidence I establish that private entrepreneurs perceive predation as a major problem running a business in China and that securing property is a main motivation for them to seek office. I use a small sample of legislative and policy proposals from entrepreneur-legislators and show that they seldom formally discuss property rights issue.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Private Sector in Public OfficeSelective Property Rights in China, pp. 69 - 101Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019