Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures, Tables, and Boxes
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Selective Property Rights
- 3 Private Entrepreneurs in Legislative Office
- 4 Motivations to Run
- 5 Protection from Predation
- 6 Legislator Status and Political Capital
- 7 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Bibliography (with Chinese-Language References)
- Index
- Series
6 - Legislator Status and Political Capital
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 August 2019
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures, Tables, and Boxes
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Selective Property Rights
- 3 Private Entrepreneurs in Legislative Office
- 4 Motivations to Run
- 5 Protection from Predation
- 6 Legislator Status and Political Capital
- 7 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Bibliography (with Chinese-Language References)
- Index
- Series
Summary
This chapter tests the key mechanism: the political status of a legislator sends a credible signal of strong political connections to low-level bureaucrats, which deters expropriations. This mechanism is supported by interview evidence, a case study and two national audit experiments on local government officials. I show that Chinese bureaucrats are much more likely to respond to entrepreneurs with connections to local legislatures, while being a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) member does not trigger any preferential behavior of bureaucrats toward entrepreneurs.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Private Sector in Public OfficeSelective Property Rights in China, pp. 127 - 155Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2019