4 - Principal's preference, organizational structure and the likelihood of control

Summary

It may seem obvious that what you want affects the probability that you will get it. Yet studies of bureaucratic control typically do not differentiate among types of preferences. That is, the following two assumptions are implicit in most academic discussions of bureaucratic control:

1. If Principal A can secure Preference P from Agent X, then Principal A can secure Preference Q from Agent X; and

2. If Principal A cannot secure Preference P from Agent X, then Principal A cannot secure Preference Q from Agent X.

But these are tenuous assumptions. Differences in the character of the desired outcome may affect the ability of the principal to compel some behavior from the agent. For example, the President may be able to induce more rigorous enforcement from the Environmental Protection Agency but be unable to prompt less rigorous enforcement from the same agency. Such differences would consistently affect the likelihood of preference satisfaction. Thus they are an important part of the bureaucratic control story.

This chapter introduces a refinement of the bureaucratic control literature. The comparative study of hybrids and agencies underlying this book revealed an interaction effect with this previously overlooked variable: preference type. Hybrid organizations are, on average, less likely to satisfy principal's preferences than government agencies. But it is also clear that the preferences that are satisfied by hybrids share characteristics, as do those that are not satisfied.