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9 - Worship, Excellence, and Intrinsic Value

from Part III - Normative Aspects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

Aaron Segal
Affiliation:
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Samuel Lebens
Affiliation:
University of Haifa, Israel
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Summary

In this chapter, I explore and defend the idea that the core experience of worship involves a fitting response to the excellence of the divine, and that this can be understood in roughly the same ways that we understand fitting responses to excellence in general. I also defend a particular account of the excellence involved here – I argue that in worship, as in many other cases of fitting response to excellence, we are tracking intrinsic value. Along the way, I respond to Mark Murphy’s arguments for the conclusion that no creature could have intrinsic value.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Philosophy of Worship
Divine and Human Aspects
, pp. 152 - 169
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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