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2 - The Metaethics of Worship

from Part I - Two Introductions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

By
Elliot Salinger
Edited by
Aaron Segal  and
Samuel Lebens
Aaron Segal
Affiliation:
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Samuel Lebens
Affiliation:
University of Haifa, Israel
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Summary

A philosophical account of worship will answer at least two questions: the constitutive question of what worship is, and the normative question of what normative standards govern worship. The questions are related because what normative standards govern worship depends on whether worship consists primarily of some attitude or some action. This chapter briefly surveys the theoretical terrain of answers to these questions, with special attention to identifying the minimal conditions under which worship is fitting or supported by reasons.

Keywords

worshipattitudesfittingnessreasonsrationality
Type
Chapter
Information
The Philosophy of Worship
Divine and Human Aspects
 , pp. 16 - 28
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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