Book contents
- On Philosophy and Philosophers
- On Philosophy and Philosophers
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Note on Sources
- Introduction: Rorty as a Critical Philosopher
- I Early Papers
- 1 Philosophy as Ethics
- 2 Philosophy as Spectatorship and Participation
- 3 Kant as a Critical Philosopher
- 4 The Paradox of Definitism
- 5 Reductionism
- 6 Phenomenology, Linguistic Analysis, and Cartesianism: Comments on Ricoeur
- 7 The Incommunicability of “Felt Qualities”
- 8 Kripke on Mind-Body Identity
- II Later Papers
- Index of Names
1 - Philosophy as Ethics
from I - Early Papers
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 October 2020
- On Philosophy and Philosophers
- On Philosophy and Philosophers
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- Note on Sources
- Introduction: Rorty as a Critical Philosopher
- I Early Papers
- 1 Philosophy as Ethics
- 2 Philosophy as Spectatorship and Participation
- 3 Kant as a Critical Philosopher
- 4 The Paradox of Definitism
- 5 Reductionism
- 6 Phenomenology, Linguistic Analysis, and Cartesianism: Comments on Ricoeur
- 7 The Incommunicability of “Felt Qualities”
- 8 Kripke on Mind-Body Identity
- II Later Papers
- Index of Names
Summary
The most accessible paper in this volume, “Philosophy as Ethics” traces the historical origins of philosophy and the initial spur to philosophizing to the desire to justify values. Ethics, on this view, includes “aesthetics, political philosophy, and the philosophical parts of moral theology” and is at the root of the main branches of philosophy – metaphysics, logic, epistemology, even science. Yet it is only when questions cease to have ethical implications, Rorty argues, that they are ceded to these areas of inquiry. In the spirit of William James, Rorty underscores the futility of the two-thousand-year “pathetic history” of failed attempts to justify ethical imperatives. Still, he finds a positive lesson here, arguing that “a bad reason may be a good story.” He uses James’s theory of truth to show that there is a pragmatic way to argue an “ought” to an “is” that avoids problems associated with positivism and foundationalism.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- On Philosophy and PhilosophersUnpublished Papers, 1960–2000, pp. 13 - 24Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020