Book contents
- Negative Actions
- Negative Actions
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Action and Ontology
- Chapter 2 The Problem of Negative Action
- Chapter 3 Mere Manifestations of Agency?
- Chapter 4 The Logical Form of Negative Action Sentences I
- Chapter 5 The Logical Form of Negative Action Sentences II
- Chapter 6 The Logical Form of Negative Action Sentences III
- Chapter 7 Realizer-Functionalism and the Metaphysics of Events
- Chapter 8 Objections
- Conclusion
- References
- Index
- References
References
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 February 2021
Book contents
- Negative Actions
- Negative Actions
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Action and Ontology
- Chapter 2 The Problem of Negative Action
- Chapter 3 Mere Manifestations of Agency?
- Chapter 4 The Logical Form of Negative Action Sentences I
- Chapter 5 The Logical Form of Negative Action Sentences II
- Chapter 6 The Logical Form of Negative Action Sentences III
- Chapter 7 Realizer-Functionalism and the Metaphysics of Events
- Chapter 8 Objections
- Conclusion
- References
- Index
- References
Summary
A summary is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Negative ActionsEvents, Absences, and the Metaphysics of Agency, pp. 225 - 235Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021
References
Almotahari, Mahrad. (2014a) Metalinguistic negation and metaphysical affirmation. Philosophical Studies 167(3):497–517.Google Scholar
Almotahari, Mahrad. (2014b) The identity of a material thing and its matter. Philosophical Quarterly 64(256):387–406.Google Scholar
Alvarez, Maria. (2009) Actions, thought-experiments, and the ‘principle of alternative possibilities’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87(1):61–81.Google Scholar
Alvarez, Maria. (2013) Agency and two-way powers. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113:101–121.Google Scholar
Alvarez, Maria and Hyman, John. (1998) Agents and their actions. Philosophy 73(2):219–245.Google Scholar
Armstrong, D. M. (1989) Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
Armstrong, D. M. (1997) A World of States of Affairs. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Audi, Robert. (1994) Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe. Noûs 28(4):419–434.Google Scholar
Azzouni, Jody. (2004) Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Bach, Kent. (2010) Refraining, omitting, and negative acts. In O’Connor, Timothy and Sandis, Constantine (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Malden: Blackwell, 50–57.Google Scholar
Barker, Stephen and Jago, Mark. (2012) Being positive about negative facts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85(1):117–138.Google Scholar
Bayer, Samuel Louis. (1997) Confessions of a Lapsed Neo-Davidsonian: Events and Arguments in Compositional Semantics. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Beebee, Helen. (2004) Causing and nothingness. In Collins, John, Hall, Ned, and Paul, L. A. (eds.) Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 291–308.Google Scholar
Bennett, Jonathan. (1988) Events and Their Names. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.Google Scholar
Bentham, Jeremy. (1780) Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Reprinted 2007. Minneola, NY: Dover Publications.Google Scholar
Bernstein, Sara. (2014a) Two problems for proportionality about omissions. Dialectica 68(3):429–441.Google Scholar
Bernstein, Sara. (2014b) Omissions as possibilities. Philosophical Studies 167(1):1–23.Google Scholar
Bernstein, Sara. (2015) The metaphysics of omissions. Philosophy Compass 10(3):208–218.Google Scholar
Berto, Franceso, French, Rohan, Priest, Graham, and Ripley, David. (2018) Williamson on counterpossibles. Journal of Philosophical Logic 47(4):693–713.Google Scholar
Bird, Alexander. (2007) Nature’s Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Bishop, John. (1989) Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Bohn, Einar Duenger. (2018) Panpsychism, the combination problem, and plural collective properties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97(2):383–394.Google Scholar
Bohn, Einar Duenger. (2019) Composition as identity: Pushing forward. Synthese. doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02193-x.Google Scholar
Brand, Myles. (1971) The language of not doing. American Philosophical Quarterly 8(1):45–53.Google Scholar
Bratman, Michael. (1987) Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Buckareff, Andrei A. (2018) I’m just sitting around doing nothing: On exercising intentional agency in omitting to act. Synthese 195(10):4617–4635.Google Scholar
Burgess, John P. and Rosen, Gideon. (1999) A Subject with No Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of Mathematics. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Calosi, Claudio and Wilson, Jessica. (2019) Quantum metaphysical indeterminacy. Philosophical Studies 176(10):2599–2627.Google Scholar
Cameron, Ross P. (2008) Truthmakers and ontological commitment: Or how to deal with complex objects and mathematical ontology without getting into trouble. Philosophical Studies 140(1):1–18.Google Scholar
Castañeda, Hector-Neri. (1967) Comments on D. Davidson’s ‘The logical form of action sentences’. In Rescher, Nicholas (ed.) The Logic of Decision and Action. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 104–112.Google Scholar
Cheyne, Colin and Pigden, Charles. (2006) Negative truths from positive facts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(2):249–265.Google Scholar
Clarke, Randolph. (2010b) Reply to Sartorio. In Aguilar, Jesús H. and Buckareff, Andrei A. (eds.) Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 161–165.Google Scholar
Clarke, Randolph. (2011) Omissions, responsibility, and symmetry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82(3):594–624.Google Scholar
Clarke, Randolph. (2014) Omissions: Agency, Metaphysics, and Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Collins, John, Hall, Ned, and Paul., L. A. (eds.) (2004) Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
Colterjohn, Julia and MacIntosh, Duncan. (1987) Gerald Vision and indexicals. Analysis 47(1):58–60.Google Scholar
Danto, Arthur. (1973) Analytical Philosophy of Action. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. (1963) Actions, reasons, and causes. Reprinted in his (2001) Essays on Actions and Events, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 3–19.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. (1967a) The logical form of action sentences. Reprinted in his (2001) Essays on Actions and Events, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 105–122.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. (1967b) Causal relations. Reprinted in his (2001) Essays on Actions and Events, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 149–162.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. (1969) The individuation of events. Reprinted in his (2001) Essays on Actions and Events, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 163–180.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. (1970a) Events as particulars. Reprinted in his (2001) Essays on Actions and Events, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 181–187.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. (1971) Agency. Reprinted in his (2001) Essays on Actions and Events, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 43–61.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. (1985a) Reply to Bruce Vermazen. In Vermazen, Bruce and Hintikka, Merrill B. (eds.) Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events. New York: Oxford University Press, 217–221.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. (1985b) Reply to Quine on events. Reprinted in his (2001) Essays on Actions and Events, 2nd ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 305–311.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. (1999) Reply to Jennifer Hornsby. In Hahn, Lewis Edwin (ed.) The Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 623–640.Google Scholar
Davidson, Donald. (2005) Truth and Predication. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Demos, Raphael. (1917) A discussion of a certain type of negative proposition. Mind 26 (102):188–196.Google Scholar
DeRose, Keith. (2008) Gradeable adjectives: A defense of pluralism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):141–160.Google Scholar
Dowe, Phil. (2004) Causes are physically connected to effects: Why preventers and omissions are not causes. In Hitchcock, Christopher (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Malden: Blackwell, 189–196.Google Scholar
Dyke, Heather. (2008) Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy. New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Ehring, Douglas. (1997) Causation and Persistence: A Theory of Causation. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Ehring, Douglas. (2011) Tropes: Properties, Objects, and Mental Causation. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Enç, Berent. (2003) How We Act: Causes, Reasons, and Intentions. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Fine, Kit. (2003) The non-identity of a material thing and its matter. Mind 112(446):195–234.Google Scholar
Fine, Kit. (2006) Arguing for non-identity: A response to King and Frances. Mind 115 (460):1059–1082.Google Scholar
Fine, Kit. (2009) The question of ontology. In Chalmers, David, Manley, David, and Wasserman, Ryan (eds.) Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. New York: Oxford University Press, 157–177.Google Scholar
Frances, Bryan. (2006) The new Leibniz’s Law argument for pluralism. Mind 115(460):1007–1021.Google Scholar
Frankfurt, Harry G. (1969) Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66(23):829–839.Google Scholar
Funkhouser, Eric. (2014) The Logical Structure of Kinds. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Goldman, Alvin I. (1970) A Theory of Human Action. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.Google Scholar
Grice, H. P. (1975) Logic and conversation. Reprinted in his (1989) Studies in the Way of Words. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 22–40.Google Scholar
Hale, Bob. (2013) Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations between Them. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin. (2012) Horse sense. Journal of Philosophy 109(1–2):85–131.Google Scholar
Hanser, Matthew. (2008) Actions, acting, and acting well. In Shafer-Landau, Russ (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Vol. 3. New York: Oxford University Press, 271–298.Google Scholar
Heim, Irene and Kratzer, Angelika. (1998) Semantics in Generative Grammar. Malden: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Horn, Laurence R. (1989) A Natural History of Negation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Hornsby, Jennifer. (1986) Bodily movements, actions, and epistemology. Reprinted in her (1997) Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naïve Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 93–102.Google Scholar
Hornsby, Jennifer. (1993) Agency and causal explanation. Reprinted in her (1997) Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naïve Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 129–153.Google Scholar
Hornsby, Jennifer. (1997) Action and the mental-physical divide. In Hornsby, Jennifer (ed.) Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naïve Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 83–92.Google Scholar
Hornsby, Jennifer. (1999) Anomolousness in action. In Hahn, Lewis Edwin (ed.) The Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 623–635.Google Scholar
Hornsby, Jennifer. (2004) Agency and actions. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:1–23.Google Scholar
Hornsby, Jennifer. (2005) Truth without truthmaking entities. In Beebee, Helen and Dodd, Julian (eds.) Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Oxford University Press, 33–47.Google Scholar
Hornsby, Jennifer. (2010) The standard story of action: An exchange (2). In Aguilar, Jesús H. and Buckareff, Andrei A. (eds.) Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 57–68.Google Scholar
Hyman, John. (2015) Action, Knowledge, and the Will. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Jago, Mark. (2014) The Impossible: An Essay on Hyperintensionality. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Kaplan, David. (1989) Demonstratives: An essay on the semantics, logic, metaphysics, and epistemology of demonstratives and other indexicals. In Almog, Joseph, Perry, John, and Wettstein, Howard (eds.) Themes from Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press, 481–563.Google Scholar
Karttunen, Lauri. (1974) Presupposition and linguistic context. Theoretical Linguistics 1(1–3):181–194.Google Scholar
Kim, Jaegwon. (1973) Causation, nomic subsumption, and the concept of an event. Reprinted in his (1993) Supervenience and Mind: Selected Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press, 3–21.Google Scholar
Kim, Jaegwon. (1976) Events as property exemplifications. Reprinted in his (1993) Supervenience and Mind: Selected Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press, 33–52.Google Scholar
Kim, Jaegwon. (1991) Events: Their metaphysics and semantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51(3):641–646.Google Scholar
Kukso, Boris. (2006) The reality of absences. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84(1):21–37.Google Scholar
Landman, Fred. (2000) Events and Plurality: The Jerusalem Lectures. Norwell: Kluwer Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
Lewis, David. (1968) Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic. Reprinted in his (1983) Philosophical Papers, Vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press, 26–39.Google Scholar
Lewis, David. (1973b) Causation. Reprinted in his (1986) Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2. New York: Oxford University Press, 159–172.Google Scholar
Lewis, David. (1979) Counterfactual dependence and time’s arrow. Reprinted in his (1986) Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2. New York: Oxford University Press, 32–52.Google Scholar
Lewis, David. (1980) Index, context, and content. Reprinted in his (1998) Papers in Philosophical Logic. New York: Cambridge University Press, 21–44.Google Scholar
Lewis, David. (1983) New work for a theory of universals. Reprinted in his (1998) Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press, 8–55.Google Scholar
Lewis, David. (1992) Many, but almost one. Reprinted in his (1998) Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press, 164–182.Google Scholar
Lewis, David. (1998) A world of truthmakers? Reprinted in his (1998) Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press, 215–220.Google Scholar
Lewis, David. (2003) Things qua truthmakers. In Lillehammer, Hallvard and Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo (eds.) Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor. New York: Routledge, 25–38.Google Scholar
Lombard, Lawrence B. (1986) Events: A Metaphysical Study. London: Routledge & Keagan Paul.Google Scholar
Lowe, E. J. (1989a) What is a criterion of identity? Philosophical Quarterly 39(154):1–21.Google Scholar
Lowe, E. J. (1989b) Impredicative identity criteria and Davidson’s criterion of event identity. Analysis 49(4):178–181.Google Scholar
Lowe, E. J. (2010a) Action and ontology. In O’Connor, Timothy and Sandis, Constantine (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Malden: Blackwell, 3–9.Google Scholar
Lowe, E. J. (2010b) On the individuation of powers. In Marmodoro, Anna (ed.) The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. New York: Routledge, 8–26.Google Scholar
Ludwig, Kirk. (2010) Adverbs of action and logical form. In O’Connor, Timothy and Sandis, Constantine (eds.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Malden: Blackwell, 40–49.Google Scholar
Ludwig, Kirk. (2016) From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action, Vol. 1. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
MacBride, Fraser. (2005) Lewis’s animadversions on the truthmaker principle. In Beebee, Helen and Dodd, Julian (eds.) Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Oxford University Press, 117–140.Google Scholar
MacDonald, Cynthia and MacDonald, Graham. (2006) The metaphysics of mental causation. Journal of Philosophy 103(11):539–576.Google Scholar
MacFarlane, John. (2014) Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and Its Applications. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Martin, C. B. (1994) Dispositions and conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 44(174):1–8.Google Scholar
Martin, C. B. (1996) How it is: Entities, absences, and voids. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74(1):57–65.Google Scholar
McKitrick, Jennifer. (2010) Manifestations as effects. In Marmodoro, Anna (ed.) The Metaphysics of Powers: Their Grounding and Their Manifestations. New York: Routledge, 73–83.Google Scholar
Melia, Joseph. (2005) Truthmaking without truthmakers. In Beebee, Helen and Dodd, Julian (eds.) Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Oxford University Press, 67–84.Google Scholar
Mellor, D. H. (2004) For facts as causes and effects. In Collins, John, Hall, Ned, and Paul, L. A. (eds.) Causation and Counterfactuals. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 309–323.Google Scholar
Molnar, George. (2000) Truthmakers for negative truths. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78(1):72–86.Google Scholar
Molnar, George. (2003) Powers: A Study in Metaphysics. Edited by Mumford, Stephen. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Moore, Michael S. (1993) Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and Its Implications for Criminal Law. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Moore, Michael S. (2009) Causation and Responsibility: An Essay in Law, Morals, and Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Moore, Michael S. (2010) Renewed questions about the causal theory of action. In Aguilar, Jesús H. and Buckareff, Andrei A. (eds.) Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 27–43.Google Scholar
Moya, Carlos. (1990) The Philosophy of Action: An Introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press.Google Scholar
Mulligan, Kevin, Simons, Peter, and Smith, Barry. (1984) Truth-makers. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44(3):287–321.Google Scholar
Mumford, Stephen and Anjum, Rani Lill. (2011) Getting Causes from Powers. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Nolan, Daniel. (1997) Impossible worlds: A modest approach. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38(4):535–572.Google Scholar
O’Brien, Lucy and Soteriou., Matthew (eds.) (2009) Mental Actions. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
O’Shaughnessy, Brian. (1980) The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory, Vol. 2. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
O’Shaughnessy, Brian. (2008) The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory, Vol. 2, 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Palmer, David. (2020) Omissions: The constitution view defended. Erkenntnis 85(3):739–756.Google Scholar
Parsons, Josh. (2004) Distributional properties. In Jackson, Frank and Priest, Graham (eds.) Lewisian Themes: The Philosophy of David K. Lewis. New York: Oxford University Press, 173–180.Google Scholar
Parsons, Josh. (2007) Theories of location. In Zimmerman, Dean (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Vol. 3. New York: Oxford University Press, 201–232.Google Scholar
Parsons, Terence. (1990) Events in the Semantics of English. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.Google Scholar
Paul, L. A. and Hall, Ned. (2013) Causation: A User’s Guide. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Paul, Sarah K. (2009) Intention, belief, and wishful thinking: Setiya on ‘practical knowledge’. Ethics 119(3):546–557.Google Scholar
Payton, Jonathan D. (2020) Two problems for the constitution view of omissions: A reply to Palmer. Erkenntnis. doi: 10.1007/s10670-020-00237-0.Google Scholar
Perovic, Katarina. (2018) What is a fourdimensionalist to do about temporally extended properties? European Journal of Philosophy 27(2):1–12.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. O. (1948) On what there is. Reprinted in his (1980), From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1–19.Google Scholar
Quine, W. V. O. (1969) Existence and quantification. Reprinted in his (1969) Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press, 91–113.Google Scholar
Ramsey, Frank P. (1927) Facts and propositions (1). Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplement 7:153–170.Google Scholar
Recanati, François. (2010) Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rieppel, Michael. (2016) Being something: Properties and predicative quantification. Mind 125(499):643–689.Google Scholar
Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. (2002) Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. (2005) Why truthmakers. In Beebee, Helen and Dodd, Julian (eds.) Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. New York: Oxford University Press, 17–31.Google Scholar
Ruben, David-Hillel. (2003) Action and Its Explanation. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Ruben, David-Hillel. (2013) Trying in some way. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91(4):719–733.Google Scholar
Sandis, Constantine. (2012) The Things We Do and Why We Do Them. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.Google Scholar
Sandis, Constantine. (2017) The doing and the deed: Action in normative ethics. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:105–126.Google Scholar
Sartorio, Carolina. (2015) Sensitivity to reasons and actual sequences. In Shoemaker, David (ed.) Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility, Vol. 3. New York: Oxford University Press, 104–119.Google Scholar
Savellos, Elias E. (1995) Supervenience and the essences of events. In Savellos, Elias E. and Yalcin, Umit D. (eds.) Supervenience: New Essays. New York: Cambridge University Press, 244–263.Google Scholar
Schaffer, Jonathan. (2009) On what grounds what. In Chalmers, David, Manley, David, and Wasserman, Ryan (eds.) Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. New York: Oxford University Press, 347–383.Google Scholar
Schaffer, Jonathan. (2012) Disconnection and responsibility. Legal Theory 18(4):399–435.Google Scholar
Setiya, Kieran. (2007) Reasons without Rationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Setiya, Kieran. (2008) Practical knowledge. Reprinted in his (2017) Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, 39–61.Google Scholar
Setiya, Kieran. (2009) Practical knowledge revisited. Reprinted in his (2017) Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, 62–72.Google Scholar
Setiya, Kieran. (2010) Sympathy for the devil. Reprinted in his (2017) Practical Knowledge: Selected Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, 73–106.Google Scholar
Shanon, Benny. (1976) On the two kinds of presupposition in natural language. Foundations of Language 14(2):247–249.Google Scholar
Shepherd, Joshua. (2014a) The contours of control. Philosophical Studies 170(3):395–411.Google Scholar
Shepherd, Joshua. (2014b) Causalism and intentional omission. American Philosophical Quarterly 51(1):15–26.Google Scholar
Sidelle, Alan. (1991) The answering machine paradox. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21(4):525–539.Google Scholar
Sider, Theodore. (2011) Writing the Book of the World. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Silver, Kenneth. (2018) Omissions as events and actions. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4(1):33–48.Google Scholar
Smith, Michael. (2010) The standard story of action: An exchange (1). In Aguilar, Jesús H. and Buckareff, Andrei A. (eds.) Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 45–55.Google Scholar
Sprigge, Timothy L. S. (1970) Facts, Words, and Beliefs. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Stalnaker, Robert. (1968) A theory of conditionals. In Rescher, Nicholas (ed.) Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 98–112.Google Scholar
Stalnaker, Robert. (1970) Pragmatics. Reprinted in his (1999) Context and Content. New York: Oxford University Press, 31–46.Google Scholar
Steward, Helen. (1997) The Ontology of Mind: Events, States, and Processes. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Steward, Helen. (2009) Sub-intentional actions and the over-mentalization of agency. In Sandis, Constantine (ed.) New Essays on the Explanation of Action. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 295–312.Google Scholar
Steward, Helen. (2013) Processes, continuants, and individuals. Mind 122(487):781–812.Google Scholar
Stroud, Douglas Aikenhead. (1914) Mens Rea: Or, Imputability under the Law of England. London: Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd.Google Scholar
Taylor, Barry. (1983) Events and adverbs. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series 84:103–122.Google Scholar
Thompson, Judith Jarvis. (1971) The time of a killing. Journal of Philosophy 68(5):115–132.Google Scholar
Thompson, Judith Jarvis. (2003) Causation: Omissions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66(1):81–103.Google Scholar
Tiehen, Justin. (2015) The role functionalist theory of absences. Erkenntnis 80(3):505–519.Google Scholar
Unger, Peter. (1980) The problem of the many. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5(1):411–468.Google Scholar
van Inwagen, Peter. (1981) Why I don’t understand substitutional quantification. Reprinted in his (2001) Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 32–36.Google Scholar
van Inwagen, Peter. (1998) Meta-ontology. Reprinted in his (2001) Ontology, Identity, and Modality: Essays in Metaphysics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 13–31.Google Scholar
van Inwagen, Peter. (2009) Being, existence, and ontological commitment. In Chalmers, David, Manley, David, and Wasserman, Ryan (eds.) Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. New York: Oxford University Press, 472–506.Google Scholar
Vendler, Zeno. (1967) Linguistics and Philosophy. Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Vermazen, Bruce. (1985) Negative acts. In Vermazen, Bruce and Hintikka, Merrill B. (eds.) Essays on Davidson: Actions and Events. New York: Oxford University Press, 93–104.Google Scholar
von Fintel, Kai. (2004) Would you believe it? The King of France is back! (Presuppositions and truth-value intuitions). In Reimer, Marga and Bezuidenhout, Anne (eds.) Descriptions and Beyond. New York: Oxford University Press, 315–341.Google Scholar
Williams, Donald C. (1953a) On the elements of being: I. Review of Metaphysics 7(1):3–18.Google Scholar
Williams, Donald C. (1953b) On the elements of being: II. Review of Metaphysics 7(2):171–192.Google Scholar
Williamson, Timothy. (2000) Knowledge and Its Limits. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Williamson, Timothy. (2013) Modal Logic as Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Wilson, Jessica. (2009) Determination, realization, and mental causation. Philosophical Studies 145(1):149–169.Google Scholar
Wilson, Jessica. (2011b) Non-reductive realization and the powers-based subset strategy. Monist 94(1):121–154.Google Scholar
Wilson, Jessica. (2013) A determinable-based account of metaphysical indeterminacy. Inquiry 56(4):359–385.Google Scholar
Wilson, Jessica. (2017) Are there indeterminate states of affairs? Yes. In Barnes, Elizabeth (ed.) Current Controversies in Metaphysics. New York: Routledge, 105–119.Google Scholar
Wyner, Adam. (1989) The semantics of adverbs and the perception problem. Proceedings of the 1989 Western States Conference on Linguistics. Arizona State University, October 13–15, 1989.Google Scholar
Yablo, Stephen. (1992a) Cause and essence. Reprinted in his (2010) Things: Papers on Objects, Events, and Properties. New York: Oxford University Press, 59–97.Google Scholar
Yablo, Stephen. (1992b) Mental causation. Reprinted in his (2010) Thoughts: Papers on Mind, Meaning, and Modality. New York: Oxford University Press, 222–248.Google Scholar