Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Maps
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 Trachenberg and Reichenbach
- 2 The Silesian Army
- 3 “The infamous conduct of the Prussians”
- 4 Löwenberg
- 5 Goldberg
- 6 The Katzbach
- 7 Blücher’s hare hunt
- 8 “Nothing more remains than to have them shot dead”
- 9 Lusatia
- 10 The Middle Elbe
- 11 The Mulde
- 12 Hide and seek
- 13 Opening round
- 14 “A battle of the most obstinate and sanguinary class”
- 15 Leipzig
- 16 Race to the Rhine
- Assessment
- Bibliography
- Index
5 - Goldberg
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2015
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Maps
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 Trachenberg and Reichenbach
- 2 The Silesian Army
- 3 “The infamous conduct of the Prussians”
- 4 Löwenberg
- 5 Goldberg
- 6 The Katzbach
- 7 Blücher’s hare hunt
- 8 “Nothing more remains than to have them shot dead”
- 9 Lusatia
- 10 The Middle Elbe
- 11 The Mulde
- 12 Hide and seek
- 13 Opening round
- 14 “A battle of the most obstinate and sanguinary class”
- 15 Leipzig
- 16 Race to the Rhine
- Assessment
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
As the Reichenbach Plan deferred the initiative to Napoleon, the Army of Bohemia could do little until Allied High Command determined the emperor’s intentions. To this end, Austrian intelligence proved totally inadequate during the last weeks of the armistice. Having almost no news of Napoleon, Schwarzenberg could only hope that the emperor would not cross the Erzgebirge before the Russians and Prussians arrived from Silesia. Aside from knowing very little of Napoleon’s intentions, the Austrians possessed only a vague idea of his troop dispositions along the Bohemian frontier. After allocating sufficient forces to other theaters, they assumed that 151,000 men out of a total of 413,000 would remain at Napoleon’s immediate disposal for an invasion of Bohemia. Yet to everyone’s surprise, the French gave no indication of conducting such an operation. By the time a council of war convened at Melnik on 17 August, most Allied commanders believed Napoleon would attack Bernadotte rather than invade Bohemia. Reports confirmed the concentration of large imperial forces for an offensive against Berlin. Although intelligence placed Napoleon at Bunzlau, spies reported that French authorities expected him to arrive at Görlitz from where he would turn north to Cottbus and direct the drive on the Prussian capital. While the emperor conducted his “master plan,” imperial forces along the Bohemian frontier and in Silesia would mask the Allied armies facing them. According to the Reichenbach Plan, the Army of Bohemia should respond by crossing the Erzgebirge. While the Army of North Germany retreated ahead of Napoleon’s offensive, Schwarzenberg would either take Dresden or march on Leipzig to sever French communications.
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- Napoleon and the Struggle for GermanyThe Franco-Prussian War of 1813, pp. 199 - 234Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2015