Chapter 11 - Bolzano’s logical realism

Summary

Bolzano's Theory of Science presents the first explicit and methodical espousal of internal logical realism. It also contains a formidable number of theoretical innovations. They include: the first account of the distinction between sense and reference; definitions of analyticity and consequence, i.e. deducibility based on a new substitutional procedure that anticipates Quine's and Tarski's, respectively; and an account of mathematical knowledge that excludes, contra Kant. In Bolzano's case, one of the main purposes in introducing propositions in themselves is to achieve precise and satisfactory definitions. By way of consequence, on Bolzano's own account the success of the endeavour depends on whether his commitment to propositions allows him to deliver a good theory of logic, or at least one that is preferable to its rivals. Bolzano did have views on epistemic modality, though unfortunately, there is no place for a discussion of the latter here.