Book contents
- Making Social Spending Work
- Making Social Spending Work
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Appendices
- Part I Overview
- Part II The Long Rise, and Its Causes
- Part III What Effects?
- Chapter 8 Effects on Growth, Jobs, and Life
- Chapter 9 Why No Net Loss of GDP or Work?
- Chapter 10 Do the Rich Pay the Poor for All This?
- Part IV Confronting Threats
- Acknowledgments
- Notes
- References
- Index
Chapter 8 - Effects on Growth, Jobs, and Life
from Part III - What Effects?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2021
Book contents
- Making Social Spending Work
- Making Social Spending Work
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Appendices
- Part I Overview
- Part II The Long Rise, and Its Causes
- Part III What Effects?
- Chapter 8 Effects on Growth, Jobs, and Life
- Chapter 9 Why No Net Loss of GDP or Work?
- Chapter 10 Do the Rich Pay the Poor for All This?
- Part IV Confronting Threats
- Acknowledgments
- Notes
- References
- Index
Summary
Larger social spending budgets have not produced any net loss of GDP, or in skills, or in work. Without any such costs, Europe’s welfare states have produced greater equality, cleaner government, and even longer life. So says the international evidence for any decade or combination of decades back to 1880, before which there was little social spending at all. The belief that greater social spending must somehow shrink the size of the economic pie is in trouble, and is likely to keep retreating in the wake of the slump of 2020.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Making Social Spending Work , pp. 153 - 175Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021