Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 Lord Barham's Admiralty: 1805
- 2 Admiralty reform, 1806–1835
- 3 Decision-making at the Admiralty, c. 1806–1830
- 4 Admiralty administration and decision-making, c. 1830–1868. The Graham Admiralty
- 5 The Admiralty reformed again: context and problems, 1868–1885
- 6 Administrative and policy-making responses, c. 1882 onwards
- 7 Fisher and Churchill, and their successors, 1902–1917
- 8 The Naval Staff, planning and policy
- 9 Lord Beatty's Admiralty
- Conclusion
- Appendix 1 First Lords, First Sea Lords and Permanent Secretaries, 1805–1927
- Appendix 2 Acronyms and definitions
- Manuscript sources and select bibliography
- Index
8 - The Naval Staff, planning and policy
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 03 May 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of tables
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1 Lord Barham's Admiralty: 1805
- 2 Admiralty reform, 1806–1835
- 3 Decision-making at the Admiralty, c. 1806–1830
- 4 Admiralty administration and decision-making, c. 1830–1868. The Graham Admiralty
- 5 The Admiralty reformed again: context and problems, 1868–1885
- 6 Administrative and policy-making responses, c. 1882 onwards
- 7 Fisher and Churchill, and their successors, 1902–1917
- 8 The Naval Staff, planning and policy
- 9 Lord Beatty's Admiralty
- Conclusion
- Appendix 1 First Lords, First Sea Lords and Permanent Secretaries, 1805–1927
- Appendix 2 Acronyms and definitions
- Manuscript sources and select bibliography
- Index
Summary
Staff education, doctrine and discussion, before the war
We have seen that various advances were made in the Intelligence Department and the associated staff during the decade or so before the First World War, what with the broadening of the existing organisation, and the attempts to improve direction and co-ordination. Properly to assess the achievement, however, we must take account of what hindsight shows us to be a closely connected series of requirements for effective naval planning in the modern era. First, if plans are to be drawn up, and later carried through operationally, then one needs adequately trained staff officers both at the centre, acting as the chief planners, and others serving the commanding officers at the sharp end. That obviously implies schemes of staff education; but what it also entails, if staff are to talk to and understand staff, is a set of principles common to all and suitable as a basis for action. In short, one needs doctrine. But doctrine is not sufficient, either at the centre or the periphery; one also needs informed discussion. At the operational level it may well be necessary so officers understand fully what is expected of them, and can if needed point out potential difficulties. Much the same is necessary at the planning level; here we can refer again to what W. Graham Greene wrote in 1910:
there are certain important questions which ought to be discussed & which ought not to be left entirely to a settlement by one man's brain. However good an individual may be he is certain to get useful ideas from others.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Making of the Modern AdmiraltyBritish Naval Policy-Making, 1805–1927, pp. 242 - 270Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011