Book contents
- A Logical Foundation for Potentialist Set Theory
- A Logical Foundation for Potentialist Set Theory
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- Part I
- Part II
- Part III
- 10 Platonism or Nominalism?
- 11 Indispensability
- 12 Modal If-Thenist Paraphrase Strategy
- 13 Explanatory Indispensability
- 14 Physical Magnitude Statements and Sparsity
- 15 Weak Quantifier Variance and Mathematical Objects
- 16 Weak Quantifier Variance, Knowledge by Stipulative Definition and Access Worries
- 17 Logicism and Structuralism
- 18 Anti-Objectivism About Set Theory
- 19 Conclusion
- Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index
10 - Platonism or Nominalism?
from Part III
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2022
Book contents
- A Logical Foundation for Potentialist Set Theory
- A Logical Foundation for Potentialist Set Theory
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- Part I
- Part II
- Part III
- 10 Platonism or Nominalism?
- 11 Indispensability
- 12 Modal If-Thenist Paraphrase Strategy
- 13 Explanatory Indispensability
- 14 Physical Magnitude Statements and Sparsity
- 15 Weak Quantifier Variance and Mathematical Objects
- 16 Weak Quantifier Variance, Knowledge by Stipulative Definition and Access Worries
- 17 Logicism and Structuralism
- 18 Anti-Objectivism About Set Theory
- 19 Conclusion
- Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
This chapter notes how the potentialist set theory advocated in previous chapters can be naturally extended to a larger philosophy of mathematics, either in a nominalist or a neo-carnapian fashion.
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- A Logical Foundation for Potentialist Set Theory , pp. 111 - 115Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022