We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 October 2010
The formal conception articulates no presumption for a particular entity to be an international person. The international legal system is declared completely open: anyone being the addressee of an international norm (right, duty or capacity) is an international person. Consequently, international personality is an a posteriori concept. In principle, there are also no direct legal consequences attached to being an international person. In particular, the capacity to create international law does not follow from personality. Hans Kelsen formulated the formal conception as part of his pure theory of law. It has been advocated, among others, by Paul Guggenheim, D. P. O'Connell and, perhaps most prominently, Julio A. Barberis. The main legal manifestations of the conception are the LaGrand and Avena decisions of the ICJ as well as mixed claims under BITs and human rights treaties in general.
Basic propositions
The formal conception declares personality in international law an essentially open concept. There are no limits as to which entities can be international persons:
Examinant le domaine de validité personnel du droit international, il convient de se demander pour quels sujets vaut cet ordre, à qui il s'adresse, c'est-à-dire quels sont les sujets dont il règle la conduite, les droits et les devoirs. Nous aurons à montrer qu'à cet égard la validité du droit international ne connaît pas de limites.
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.
