Book contents
- The Law As a Conversation among Equals
- Cambridge Studies in Constitutional Law
- The Law As a Conversation among Equals
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Constitutionalism and Democracy
- 2 The Law As Conversation among Equals
- 3 “Democratic Dissonance”
- 4 A Constitution Marked by a “Discomfort with Democracy”
- 5 Motivations and Institutions: “If Men Were Angels”
- 6 The Structural Difficulties of Representation
- 7 The Rise and Fall of Popular Control
- 8 The Periodic Vote, or “Electoral Extortion”
- 9 Checks and Balances
- 10 Presidentialism
- 11 Rights
- 12 Social Rights and the “Engine Room”
- 13 Judicial Review
- 14 Constitutional Interpretation
- 15 Constitution Making
- 16 The Birth of Dialogical Constitutionalism
- 17 Why We Care About Dialogue
- 18 “Democratic Erosion”
- 19 The New Deliberative Assemblies
- 20 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
7 - The Rise and Fall of Popular Control
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 April 2022
- The Law As a Conversation among Equals
- Cambridge Studies in Constitutional Law
- The Law As a Conversation among Equals
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Constitutionalism and Democracy
- 2 The Law As Conversation among Equals
- 3 “Democratic Dissonance”
- 4 A Constitution Marked by a “Discomfort with Democracy”
- 5 Motivations and Institutions: “If Men Were Angels”
- 6 The Structural Difficulties of Representation
- 7 The Rise and Fall of Popular Control
- 8 The Periodic Vote, or “Electoral Extortion”
- 9 Checks and Balances
- 10 Presidentialism
- 11 Rights
- 12 Social Rights and the “Engine Room”
- 13 Judicial Review
- 14 Constitutional Interpretation
- 15 Constitution Making
- 16 The Birth of Dialogical Constitutionalism
- 17 Why We Care About Dialogue
- 18 “Democratic Erosion”
- 19 The New Deliberative Assemblies
- 20 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In this chapter, I maintain that the system of controls on government chosen during the origins of modern constitutionalism reflected the fear of and resistance against citizen activism. For this reason, of the different control models that were considered, “internal” or “endogenous” controls were chosen over others that emphasized “popular,” “external,” and “exogenous” controls. This choice, I demonstrate, explains the gradual elimination of “external” tools for establishing “popular” control over representations, which were commonly employed or valued at the time. These tools included the right to recall, mandatory instructions, annual elections, mandatory rotation, etc.
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- The Law As a Conversation among Equals , pp. 98 - 107Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022