Book contents
- Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace after 100 Years
- Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace after 100 Years
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Plates
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Lessons of Keynes’s Economic Consequences in a Turbulent Century
- 2 The Making of a Classic: Keynes and the Origins of The Economic Consequences of the Peace
- 3 Keynes’s Economic Consequences (1919)
- 4 “Too Bad to Be True”: Swedish Economists on Keynes’s The Economic Consequences of the Peace and German Reparations, 1919–29
- 5 Revisionism as Intellectual-Political Vindication, or the French Receptions of Consequences after the Two World Wars (1919–1946)
- 6 Between Cambridge, Paris, and Amsterdam
- 7 Keynes, the Transfer Problem, and Reparations
- 8 The Speculative Consequences of the Peace
- 9 Why Was Keynes Opposed to Reparations and a Carthaginian Peace?
- 10 One Case Where The Economic Consequences of the Peace Mattered
- 11 Keynes and International Trade Politics after the First World War
- 12 Gold, International Monetary Cooperation, and the Tripartite Agreement of 1936
- 13 Exchange Rates, Tariffs and Prices in 1930s Britain
- 14 “Unusual, Unstable, Complicated, Unreliable and Temporary”: Reinterpreting the Ebb and Flow of Globalization
- 15 Keynes’s Arc of Discovery
- 16 Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, and Popular Perceptions of the First World War
- Index
- Plate Section (PDF Only)
- References
6 - Between Cambridge, Paris, and Amsterdam
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 December 2023
Book contents
- Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace after 100 Years
- Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace after 100 Years
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Plates
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Lessons of Keynes’s Economic Consequences in a Turbulent Century
- 2 The Making of a Classic: Keynes and the Origins of The Economic Consequences of the Peace
- 3 Keynes’s Economic Consequences (1919)
- 4 “Too Bad to Be True”: Swedish Economists on Keynes’s The Economic Consequences of the Peace and German Reparations, 1919–29
- 5 Revisionism as Intellectual-Political Vindication, or the French Receptions of Consequences after the Two World Wars (1919–1946)
- 6 Between Cambridge, Paris, and Amsterdam
- 7 Keynes, the Transfer Problem, and Reparations
- 8 The Speculative Consequences of the Peace
- 9 Why Was Keynes Opposed to Reparations and a Carthaginian Peace?
- 10 One Case Where The Economic Consequences of the Peace Mattered
- 11 Keynes and International Trade Politics after the First World War
- 12 Gold, International Monetary Cooperation, and the Tripartite Agreement of 1936
- 13 Exchange Rates, Tariffs and Prices in 1930s Britain
- 14 “Unusual, Unstable, Complicated, Unreliable and Temporary”: Reinterpreting the Ebb and Flow of Globalization
- 15 Keynes’s Arc of Discovery
- 16 Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, and Popular Perceptions of the First World War
- Index
- Plate Section (PDF Only)
- References
Summary
This chapter examines different styles and contents of attempts to revise the outcome of the Paris Peace Conference. It contrasts the devastating critique of the Economic Consequences, with specific proposals with which Keynes was involved that began in November 1919 with meetings in Amsterdam hosted by the Dutch banker Gerard Vissering, and involving a wide range of international bankers, including some influential Americans. The Amsterdam meeting suggested a plan for leveraging private U.S. finance for the sustainable reconstruction of Europe that anticipated some aspects of the 1924 Dawes Plan. Keynes found his role in the Amsterdam plan undermined by the notoriety of the Economic Consequences and the disapprobrium it attracted. How could he hope to persuade the U.S. government after the attack on Woodrow Wilson mounted in the Economic Consequences? There is a sharp contrast – even contradiction – between the Cambridge world of sharp analysis and polemic and the Amsterdam approach, where market-oriented people tried to devise a solution using financial products/financial engineering. And each of these approaches was also quite different from the diplomatic logic that had produced the Versailles Treaty.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Keynes's Economic Consequences of the Peace after 100 YearsPolemics and Policy, pp. 154 - 178Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024
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