Book contents
- Israeli Foreign Policy since the End of the Cold War
- Cambridge Middle East Studies
- Israeli Foreign Policy since the End of the Cold War
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Maps
- Figures
- Acknowledgements
- Chronology
- Abbreviations
- Maps
- Introduction
- 1 Entrenchment
- 2 Redirection
- 3 On the Brink of Peace?
- 4 Engagement Incomplete
- 5 Engagement under Assault
- 6 The Dividends of Engagement
- 7 Unpicking the Oslo Accords
- 8 Backtracking
- 9 Just Beyond Reach
- 10 Between Engagement and Unilateralism
- 11 In Search of a Foreign Policy Paradigm
- 12 A Perfect Storm
- 13 The Road Map for Regime Change
- 14 The Resurgence of Unilateralism
- 15 Events Dear Boy, Events
- 16 The End of the Road
- 17 Vulnerable Ties
- Epilogue: Israel’s Wondrous Decade?
- Appendix List of Persons Interviewed
- References
- Index
- Books in the Series
9 - Just Beyond Reach
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 December 2020
- Israeli Foreign Policy since the End of the Cold War
- Cambridge Middle East Studies
- Israeli Foreign Policy since the End of the Cold War
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Maps
- Figures
- Acknowledgements
- Chronology
- Abbreviations
- Maps
- Introduction
- 1 Entrenchment
- 2 Redirection
- 3 On the Brink of Peace?
- 4 Engagement Incomplete
- 5 Engagement under Assault
- 6 The Dividends of Engagement
- 7 Unpicking the Oslo Accords
- 8 Backtracking
- 9 Just Beyond Reach
- 10 Between Engagement and Unilateralism
- 11 In Search of a Foreign Policy Paradigm
- 12 A Perfect Storm
- 13 The Road Map for Regime Change
- 14 The Resurgence of Unilateralism
- 15 Events Dear Boy, Events
- 16 The End of the Road
- 17 Vulnerable Ties
- Epilogue: Israel’s Wondrous Decade?
- Appendix List of Persons Interviewed
- References
- Index
- Books in the Series
Summary
Chapter 9 examines the resurgence of Israel’s policy of engagement under the premiership of Ehud Barak, who used his position as primary decision-maker to redirect the focus of Israel’s peace negotiations from the Palestinians to Syria. The chapter scrutinizes this process by focusing on the Blair House meeting, the Shepherdstown summit and the encounter in Geneva betweenUS President Bill Clinton, and Syria’s President Hafez al-Assad. The chapter provides a novel explanation of how Barak remained hostage to a set of domestic factors, which was decisive in the failure of the Israel-Syria peace process. These domestic factors included hostile Israeli public opinion to withdrawing from the Golan, Barak’s fractured coalition, and attempts to impose tough conditions through legislation on subjecting any peace agreement with Syria toreferendum. However, the Syrian president was equally inhibited by domestic factors, which determined his decision to reject the Israeli offer relayed by US President Clinton, to withdraw from the Golan Heights in exchange for a comprehensive peace. Al-Assad’s domestic constraints included his own ill health, his commitment to Ba'ath ideology, and his concern that concessions to Israel might torpedo the succession of power from him to his son, Bashar.
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- Israeli Foreign Policy since the End of the Cold War , pp. 195 - 214Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020