Book contents
- The Intelligence War against the IRA
- The Intelligence War against the IRA
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I The Intelligence War: August 1969 to July 1972
- Part II On the Verge of Defeat? The Intelligence War: July 1972 to December 1975
- Part III The Struggle to Contain the IRA: January 1976 to April 1998
- 7 British Political, Military and Intelligence Strategy towards the IRA: 1976–1998
- 8 The Intelligence War against the IRA in Belfast and Derry City, January 1976 to August 1994
- 9 The Intelligence War against the IRA in Rural Areas and England and the IRA Leadership, January 1976 to August 1994
- 10 ‘It’s the Primacy of Politics That’s Important’: Alternative Reasons for the IRA’s Ceasefires in August 1994 and July 1997
- Conclusion
- Book part
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
10 - ‘It’s the Primacy of Politics That’s Important’: Alternative Reasons for the IRA’s Ceasefires in August 1994 and July 1997
from Part III - The Struggle to Contain the IRA: January 1976 to April 1998
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 March 2020
- The Intelligence War against the IRA
- The Intelligence War against the IRA
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I The Intelligence War: August 1969 to July 1972
- Part II On the Verge of Defeat? The Intelligence War: July 1972 to December 1975
- Part III The Struggle to Contain the IRA: January 1976 to April 1998
- 7 British Political, Military and Intelligence Strategy towards the IRA: 1976–1998
- 8 The Intelligence War against the IRA in Belfast and Derry City, January 1976 to August 1994
- 9 The Intelligence War against the IRA in Rural Areas and England and the IRA Leadership, January 1976 to August 1994
- 10 ‘It’s the Primacy of Politics That’s Important’: Alternative Reasons for the IRA’s Ceasefires in August 1994 and July 1997
- Conclusion
- Book part
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Chapter 10 suggests that the Irish government and the SDLP talked to Sinn Féin from the late 1980s for two primary reasons: Sinn Féin’s sizeable minority of nationalist support in Northern Ireland, and the IRA’s persistence. Continuing IRA activity, Sinn Féin’s electoral mandate in Northern Ireland, and the pan-nationalist talks also encouraged a shift in British government strategy towards trying to bring republicans into a political settlement in the 1990s. The IRA’s aim of encouraging the British government to return to talks had succeeded by the 1990s. Nonetheless, this chapter suggests that the electoral stagnation of Sinn Féin alongside the stalemate that the conflict had reached by the 1990s convinced the republican leadership to make political concessions in talks. But the prospect of further increasing Sinn Féin’s electoral mandate and achieving concessions for Irish nationalists via the pan-nationalist alliance also influenced Irish republicans to end the armed campaign. This chapter also explores how various grass-roots republicans agreed with the peace process strategy, and why Denis Donaldson and other Sinn Féin informers were not pivotal to the peace process strategy being formed and accepted within republicanism. I emphasise the importance of political factors, rather than the intelligence war, in leading to peace.
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- The Intelligence War against the IRA , pp. 199 - 235Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2020