Book contents
- Informal Governance in World Politics
- Informal Governance in World Politics
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Informality of Institutions
- 2 From Complex Interdependence to Complex Governance
- 3 Soft Pooling
- 4 Informal Governance in the Development Regime
- 5 Informal Governance of International Climate Policy
- 6 Why Do States Cooperate Informally?
- Part III Informality within Institutions
- Part IV Informality around Institutions
- Part V Normative Issues
- Part VI Conclusion
- References
- Index
5 - Informal Governance of International Climate Policy
from Part II - Informality of Institutions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 May 2024
- Informal Governance in World Politics
- Informal Governance in World Politics
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Informality of Institutions
- 2 From Complex Interdependence to Complex Governance
- 3 Soft Pooling
- 4 Informal Governance in the Development Regime
- 5 Informal Governance of International Climate Policy
- 6 Why Do States Cooperate Informally?
- Part III Informality within Institutions
- Part IV Informality around Institutions
- Part V Normative Issues
- Part VI Conclusion
- References
- Index
Summary
We assess the development of informality in international climate policy on two levels: Whether informal organizations meaningfully contribute to climate change mitigation, and what role informality plays under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Proliferation of informal intergovernmental organizations (IIGOs) has enabled the move from a rigid list of countries with and without commitments, to the Paris Agreement, under which each country contributes to mitigation. Within the UNFCCC process, we find a “formality-informality cycle,” in which actors sometimes render rules and procedures more flexible and hence more efficient, only to suddenly reverse this trend at other times. Such a high-profile reversal occurred in Copenhagen in 2009. Subsequently, through the use of highly transparent negotiation procedures, trust in informality increased again, allowing negotiators to successfully override Nicaragua’s opposition in Paris in 2015. Similar formality-informality cycles can be observed on specific topics within the UNFCCC negotiations, such as international market mechanisms.
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- Informal Governance in World Politics , pp. 107 - 129Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024