2 - Developments in self-concept theory and research: affect, context, and variability

Summary

Theory and research on constructs such as the self-concept, which have a considerable history in psychology, are inevitably influenced by prevailing scientific opinions and developments at a particular point in time (Baumeister, 1987; Logan, 1987). In the sixties and seventies the self-concept was a rather unproblematic construct, predominantly handled as a trait: a relatively stable, generalized, cognitive set or system of descriptive features, characteristic of a particular individual. The majority of methods still used to investigate the self-concept, mainly variations of self-esteem questionnaires, underline this view (Byrne, 1996; Wylie, 1989).

This solid picture has, however, been questioned during the last two decades from different angles. Markus and Wurf's (1987) proposal for a dynamic self-concept, in which situational influences are taken into account, has been very influential in this process. Not surprisingly, the focusing on situational aspects of the self-concept undermines its supposed stability. Furthermore, the strictly cognitivistic interpretation of the self-concept has been differentiated (Byrne, 1996; Damon and Hart, 1988; Greenwald and Pratkanis, 1984), most explicitly by Epstein (1993a).

In this chapter the attention is focused on the foregoing three issues. The traditional conceptualization of the self-concept will be examined in the light of recent developments: (a) the cognitive view of the self-concept will be confronted with the role of emotion, (b) the idea of a generalized construct faces the problem of how to take the context into account, and (c) the assumed stability of the self-concept has to stand up against observed situational and temporal variability of the self-concept.