Chapter 1 - “Irrational Cognition of the Rational”

Summary

This chapter describes Hegel's critique of the logic of the Aristotelian tradition, going back to Aristotle's organon. It argues that Hegel has an immanent critique of this logic, according to which it cannot justify itself in a non-question begging way. It explains why Hegel regards this logic as empirical, even though it is not so in any straightforward way. Some attention to the constitutivism of the Aristotelian tradition, and its interest in the norms internal to certain capacities or faculties we possess. This is not psychologism, in Frege's sense, but it is objectionably psychological according to Hegel. At the close, I suggest that Hegel's critique of Aristotle's logic is effectively the same as his critique of Kantian pure general logic.