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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 February 2016

Howard Robinson
Howard Robinson
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Central European University, Budapest
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From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance
Resurrecting the Mind
 , pp. 260 - 267
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

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  • Bibliography
  • Howard Robinson, Central European University, Budapest
  • Book: From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance
  • Online publication: 05 February 2016
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316092873.018
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  • Bibliography
  • Howard Robinson, Central European University, Budapest
  • Book: From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance
  • Online publication: 05 February 2016
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316092873.018
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  • Bibliography
  • Howard Robinson, Central European University, Budapest
  • Book: From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance
  • Online publication: 05 February 2016
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316092873.018
Available formats
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