6 - Pathways of Failure

Summary

When the constitutional bargain process is non-inclusive and nonparticipatory, and when civil society fails to operate as a democratizing force, the constitutional outcome is not likely to resolve the political and societal ills of authoritarianism. Chapter 6 addressed several of these constitutional design issues. It first examines cases where constitutions failed to limit the arbitrary powers of the monarchs (Morocco and Jordan) or presidents (Egypt and Algeria) by utilizing a constitutional design that lacked textual clarity, adopting contradictory provisions, and creating parallel institutions. Next, the chapter examines “non-consensual” constitutional designs in deeply divided societies. First, in countries where an ethnoreligious minority ruled against the majority’s will (Bahrain and Syria), new constitutions failed to institutionalize power-sharing. Second, where regional cleavages, rivalries, and grievances were prominent issues, as in Yemen and Libya, federalist and region-based power-sharing constitutional arrangements failed to prevent conflict. Lastly, where a country was deeply divided across ideological and identity lines (as was Egypt in 2012), winner-take-all approach to constitutional drafting alienated half of the population, leading to the failure of the constitution and the democratic transitional process.