5 - Problem Prioritization and Demand for Information

Summary

Agenda setting in Congress profoundly influences signaling about policy problems by the federal bureaucracy. The prioritization of problems by Congress makes congressional influence on the federal bureaucracy so pervasive that it is intrinsic to the system of dual dynamics and operates even in the absence of structured incentive systems. The U.S. Constitution mandates that Congress takes up the authority position in Elmore's problem, while bureaucracy supplies the bottom-up expertise for government decision making. The process of prioritizing problems for attention in Congress creates a demand for information that tunes signals about problems from the bureaucracy and structures the supply of information.

These top-down influences are different from the more formal methods of controlling bureaucracy. The key baseline assumption of most characterizations of the system is that bureaucracies hold private information that must be induced through incentives and disincentives. Therefore, absent a fully adequate contract and system of monitoring, bureaucracies undersupply information relevant to the policy and political calculations of legislators.

The dual dynamics of prioritization and problem solving depart from this key assumption of the nature of the information supply in the policy process. The ability to steer policy change is predicated on influencing how problems are defined and understood at upper levels of government. Bureaucracies supply information in an effort to craft problem definitions beneficial to their organizations, constituencies, and their own interests in policy making. In this model, undersupply is not a concern. Instead, the problem for policy makers lies in influencing the types, quantity, and nature of the massive amount of information generated by the federal bureaucracy.

Congress shapes the supply of information from the bureaucracy through three mechanisms. All three mechanisms relate to agenda setting in Congress and the way members of Congress choose to allocate scarce attention to the array of problems on the agenda. The mechanisms of prioritization so influential for the supply of information do not bear the heavy cost of contracts embodied in legislation or the burden of intensive monitoring.