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5 - Equality, Majority Rule, and Supermajorities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2014

Melissa Schwartzberg
Affiliation:
New York University
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Summary

Today supermajority rules are thought to solve the core problems of majority decision making – to mitigate the risks associated with majority rule. Yet as the first half of this book has shown, supermajority rule emerged as a means of addressing different problems and reducing the distinctive risks generated by unanimity requirements. The primary liability of unanimity rule was the possibility that one erroneous or self-interested member could derail a decision. Unanimity rule could not accommodate human fallibility and had a high likelihood of generating coercion. Problems with unanimity arose in religious and political contexts alike: unanimity might subject the community to the whims of one erroneous or ill-intentioned member; the true pope or the general will might be misidentified; dissension might elicit coercion on the part of the rest. Supermajority rule reduced these risks, but majority rule did so as well. The benefit of supermajority rule compared to majority rule, according to Rousseau and Condorcet in particular, is that supermajority rule attractively biases our judgment in certain restrictive contexts: toward innocence rather than guilt, or toward the preservation of liberty. In cases where there was a grave risk of erroneous decision – in false conviction, or in disabling sovereign power – a supermajority rule could be valuable.

Type
Chapter
Information
Counting the Many
The Origins and Limits of Supermajority Rule
, pp. 105 - 145
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2013

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References

Estlund, David, “Opinion Leaders, Independence, and Condorcet’s Jury Theorem,” Theory and Decision, 36 (1994): 131–162CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ladha, Krishna, “The Condorcet Jury Theorem, Free Speech, and Correlated Votes,” American Journal of Political Science 36: 617–634 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mueller, Dennis, Public Choice III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 130CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dietrich, Franz, and List, Christian, “A Model of Jury Decisions Where All Jurors Have the Same Evidence,” Synthese 142: 175–202CrossRef

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