Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 What is metaphysics?
- Chapter 2 In defence of Aristotelian metaphysics
- Chapter 3 Existence and quantification reconsidered
- Chapter 4 Identity, quantification, and number
- Chapter 5 Ontological categories
- Chapter 6 Are any kinds ontologically fundamental?
- Chapter 7 Are four categories two too many?
- Chapter 8 Four categories – and more
- Chapter 9 Neo-Aristotelianism and substance
- Chapter 10 Developmental potential
- Chapter 11 The origin of life and the definition of life
- Chapter 12 Essence, necessity, and explanation
- Chapter 13 No potency without actuality: the case of graph theory
- Chapter 14 A neo-Aristotelian substance ontology: neither relational nor constituent
- References
- Index
Chapter 10 - Developmental potential
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 December 2011
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 What is metaphysics?
- Chapter 2 In defence of Aristotelian metaphysics
- Chapter 3 Existence and quantification reconsidered
- Chapter 4 Identity, quantification, and number
- Chapter 5 Ontological categories
- Chapter 6 Are any kinds ontologically fundamental?
- Chapter 7 Are four categories two too many?
- Chapter 8 Four categories – and more
- Chapter 9 Neo-Aristotelianism and substance
- Chapter 10 Developmental potential
- Chapter 11 The origin of life and the definition of life
- Chapter 12 Essence, necessity, and explanation
- Chapter 13 No potency without actuality: the case of graph theory
- Chapter 14 A neo-Aristotelian substance ontology: neither relational nor constituent
- References
- Index
Summary
What, if anything, is developmental potential? The physical sciences deploy a well-defined concept of potential. Where F is a force field and there exists a scalar field ϕ such that F = −∇ϕ, it is said that F is conservative and that ϕ is a potential function for F. Thus do we speak of gravitational potential and electric potential. But biology has no concept equivalent to conservative force. Biology has no concept of potential as a scalar field.
Metaphysics nurtures more general notions of potential. If we start from ontological fundamentals, what might we be able to say of developmental potential? To progress, we must first acquire an understanding of development. That poses a challenge unto itself.
Keywords
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics , pp. 156 - 173Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2011
- 1
- Cited by