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Bibliography

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 November 2024

Elias Deutscher
Elias Deutscher
Affiliation:
University of East Anglia School of Law
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Competition Law and Democracy
Markets as Institutions of Antipower
 , pp. 351 - 380
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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  • Bibliography
  • Elias Deutscher, University of East Anglia School of Law
  • Book: Competition Law and Democracy
  • Online publication: 21 November 2024
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009075817.015
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  • Bibliography
  • Elias Deutscher, University of East Anglia School of Law
  • Book: Competition Law and Democracy
  • Online publication: 21 November 2024
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009075817.015
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  • Bibliography
  • Elias Deutscher, University of East Anglia School of Law
  • Book: Competition Law and Democracy
  • Online publication: 21 November 2024
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009075817.015
Available formats
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