Civility, Barbarism and the Evolution of International Humanitarian Law Who do the Laws of War Protect?
Book contents
- Civility, Barbarism, and the Evolution of International Humanitarian Law
- Civility, Barbarism, and the Evolution of International Humanitarian Law
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Sieges and the Laws of War in Europe’s Long Eighteenth Century
- 3 All’s Fair in Love and War or the Limits of the Limitations
- 4 Cultivating Humanitarianism
- 5 Limits to the Scope of Humanity as a Constraint on the Conduct of War
- 6 The State, Civility, and International Humanitarian Law
- 7 Operationalising Distinction in South Sudan
- 8 Private Military and Security Companies and International Humanitarian Law
- 9 Protecting Warfighters from Superfluous Injury and Unnecessary Suffering
- 10 Blurring the Lines
- 11 A Step Back to Take a Step Forward
- Index
- References
8 - Private Military and Security Companies and International Humanitarian Law
The Montreux Document
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 January 2024
By
Book contents
- Civility, Barbarism, and the Evolution of International Humanitarian Law
- Civility, Barbarism, and the Evolution of International Humanitarian Law
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Abbreviations
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Sieges and the Laws of War in Europe’s Long Eighteenth Century
- 3 All’s Fair in Love and War or the Limits of the Limitations
- 4 Cultivating Humanitarianism
- 5 Limits to the Scope of Humanity as a Constraint on the Conduct of War
- 6 The State, Civility, and International Humanitarian Law
- 7 Operationalising Distinction in South Sudan
- 8 Private Military and Security Companies and International Humanitarian Law
- 9 Protecting Warfighters from Superfluous Injury and Unnecessary Suffering
- 10 Blurring the Lines
- 11 A Step Back to Take a Step Forward
- Index
- References
Summary
Despite its often poor reputation and the scaremongering that accompanied its growth, the private military and security industry does not threaten the content or spirit of international humanitarian law (IHL). Nonetheless, concerns remain about both the behaviour of actors within the industry – private military and security companies (PMSCs), their employees, and employers – as well as the interest and capacity of states to hold these actors to account. There is a tension, therefore, between the clear applicability of IHL to PMSCs and doubts about its enforcement. The private military and security industry illustrates the gap between the ideals of IHL and its operational reality, and how this gap has then informed the creation of new soft law frameworks. In recent decades, international efforts have sought to further establish such guidance for the behaviour and use of PMSCs. One such effort, the Montreux Document, is an initiative of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Swiss Government, restating existing standards. While the Document has seen success in terms of state engagement and participation, PMSCs and their employers, as well as the broader regulatory climate around PMSCs, appear largely unaffected.
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- Information
- Civility, Barbarism and the Evolution of International Humanitarian LawWho do the Laws of War Protect?, pp. 156 - 176Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024
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