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7 - Conclusion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 November 2023

Ketian Zhang
Affiliation:
George Mason University, Virginia
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Summary

Chapter 7 briefly recaps the cost-balancing theory and arguments, extends the theory to other issue areas in Chinese foreign policy and the behavior of other states, and finally discusses the implications of this book for the study of international relations and Chinese foreign policy. Building upon existing research on coercion, reputation and credibility, and economic interdependence, this book proposed the cost-balancing theory to explain China’s coercion calculus. The book has implications for understanding China’s grand strategy and predicting China’s future trajectories. Furthermore, this book adds to the burgeoning literature that looks beyond purely military coercive instruments by analyzing how a rising China utilizes nonmilitarized coercion and what drives its decision to choose between military and nonmilitary tools. This book, therefore, contributes to theorizing coercion in an era of global economic interdependence. It sheds new light on policy implications for understanding China’s grand strategy, managing China’s rise, and avoiding great power conflicts, while pointing out potential pathways where the cost-balancing theory can be applied to non-China cases.

Type
Chapter
Information
China's Gambit
The Calculus of Coercion
, pp. 189 - 200
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2023

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  • Conclusion
  • Ketian Zhang, George Mason University, Virginia
  • Book: China's Gambit
  • Online publication: 30 November 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009423816.007
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  • Conclusion
  • Ketian Zhang, George Mason University, Virginia
  • Book: China's Gambit
  • Online publication: 30 November 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009423816.007
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Conclusion
  • Ketian Zhang, George Mason University, Virginia
  • Book: China's Gambit
  • Online publication: 30 November 2023
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009423816.007
Available formats
×