Book contents
- Carbon Neutrality in the Gulf
- Carbon Neutrality in the Gulf
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Circular Carbon Economy and Pathway Frameworks
- 2 Circular Cities
- 3 The GCC and the Circular Carbon Economy
- 4 Net Zero Saudi Arabia
- Part III Infrastructure
- Part IV Policy and Data Transparency
- Part V Behavioural Aspects and Human Factors
- Part VI Conclusion
- Index
- References
4 - Net Zero Saudi Arabia
How Green Can the Oil Kingdom Get?
from Part II - Circular Carbon Economy and Pathway Frameworks
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 January 2025
By
Book contents
- Carbon Neutrality in the Gulf
- Carbon Neutrality in the Gulf
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Part I Introduction
- Part II Circular Carbon Economy and Pathway Frameworks
- 2 Circular Cities
- 3 The GCC and the Circular Carbon Economy
- 4 Net Zero Saudi Arabia
- Part III Infrastructure
- Part IV Policy and Data Transparency
- Part V Behavioural Aspects and Human Factors
- Part VI Conclusion
- Index
- References
Summary
This chapter examines the implications of Saudi Arabia’s net zero by 2060 goal for domestic politics and on the kingdom’s stature in the international community. The gargantuan task of decarbonizing Saudi Arabia is evident in its disproportionate oil use: The kingdom is the world’s No. 4 consumer of oil, despite overseeing the world’s 20th biggest economy and its 41st largest population. There are legitimate doubts about the credibility of Saudi commitment to net zero, given the regime’s track record of noncompliance with prior clean energy goals. A realistic net-zero undertaking would require an overhaul of a fossil fuel-driven society and economy in less than four decades. Sweeping changes would affect the consumption of energies and services, resulting in enormous shifts in ingrained behaviour and in consuming technologies. Difficulties aside, Saudi Arabia holds major advantages in decarbonization. These include unused land with copious solar radiation, as well as geological storage near carbon emissions clusters. Since the global transition could not happen without the kingdom’s cooperation, a documented achievement of decarbonization milestones would increase global goodwill and provide added credibility required to shape the energy transition in ways that could ensure long-term roles for hydrocarbons.
Keywords
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Carbon Neutrality in the GulfBetween Well-intentioned Pledges and the Harsh Reality, pp. 57 - 82Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025
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