Book contents
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Maps
- Contributors to Volume I
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Introduction to Volume I
- 1 China to ad 180
- 2 Teispid and Achaemenid Persia (c. 550–330 bc)
- 3 Ancient Greece
- 4 Philip II, Alexander III and the Macedonian Empire
- 5 Ancient Rome: Monarchy and Republic (753–27 bc)
- 6 China ad 180–1127
- 7 Ancient Rome
- 8 The Gupta Empire (ad 400–500)
- 9 The Sassanian Empire’s Strategies
- 10 The Rashidun, Umayyad (661–750) and Abbasid (750–1258) Caliphates
- 11 Byzantine Strategy (ad 630–1204)
- 12 Strategies in the Wars of Western Europe, 476–c. 1000
- 13 Latin Christendom in the Later Middle Ages
- 14 Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Empire, ad 1206 to 1368
- 15 Hindu and Buddhist Polities of Premodern/Early Modern Mainland South-East Asia (1100–1800)
- 16 Pre-Columbian and Early Historic Native American Warfare
- 17 Ottoman Expansionism, 1300–1823
- 18 Strategy in the Wars of Pre-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa
- 19 Strategies of the Mughal Empire
- 20 China, 1368–1911
- 21 Early Modern Europe: The Habsburgs and Their Enemies, 1519–1659
- 22 Naval Strategies
- 23 The Strategy of Louis XIV
- 24 Hohenzollern Strategy under Frederick II
- 25 American Warfare in the Eighteenth Century
- Summary of Volume I
- Further Reading
- Index
15 - Hindu and Buddhist Polities of Premodern/Early Modern Mainland South-East Asia (1100–1800)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 January 2025
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Maps
- Contributors to Volume I
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Introduction to Volume I
- 1 China to ad 180
- 2 Teispid and Achaemenid Persia (c. 550–330 bc)
- 3 Ancient Greece
- 4 Philip II, Alexander III and the Macedonian Empire
- 5 Ancient Rome: Monarchy and Republic (753–27 bc)
- 6 China ad 180–1127
- 7 Ancient Rome
- 8 The Gupta Empire (ad 400–500)
- 9 The Sassanian Empire’s Strategies
- 10 The Rashidun, Umayyad (661–750) and Abbasid (750–1258) Caliphates
- 11 Byzantine Strategy (ad 630–1204)
- 12 Strategies in the Wars of Western Europe, 476–c. 1000
- 13 Latin Christendom in the Later Middle Ages
- 14 Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Empire, ad 1206 to 1368
- 15 Hindu and Buddhist Polities of Premodern/Early Modern Mainland South-East Asia (1100–1800)
- 16 Pre-Columbian and Early Historic Native American Warfare
- 17 Ottoman Expansionism, 1300–1823
- 18 Strategy in the Wars of Pre-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa
- 19 Strategies of the Mughal Empire
- 20 China, 1368–1911
- 21 Early Modern Europe: The Habsburgs and Their Enemies, 1519–1659
- 22 Naval Strategies
- 23 The Strategy of Louis XIV
- 24 Hohenzollern Strategy under Frederick II
- 25 American Warfare in the Eighteenth Century
- Summary of Volume I
- Further Reading
- Index
Summary
This chapter explores the long-term patterns of mainland south-east Asian strategic conduct and the variables behind it. In this region, the ancient Khmer Empire, the Tai polities and the Burmese, whose statecraft was influenced by Hindu and Buddhist belief, were warlike. The Hindu–Buddhist imperial concept of cakravati became the expansionistic norm shared among ambitious monarchs. Thereupon, the south-east Asian polities continually engaged in warfare to impose control over the population and tributaries. Wars were waged to displace the mass of the vanquished to enhance the victor’s economic capacity and prestige. The development of military strategy and war aims generally were geared towards the displacement and resettlement of the enemy population. Interestingly, territorial gains were minor objectives except for the crucial lines of communication and coastal areas vital for trade; polities would secure and expand their power spheres rather than dominating demarcated spaces. The fortification of the central polity also led to protracted siege warfare. In this war of attrition, stratagems, such as ruses and guerilla raids on enemy camps and supply lines, were widely employed against invading armies. There were continual shifts from forceful subjugation and vassalage to the strategic destruction of enemy polities from the twelfth to the nineteenth century in order to seize the centre. Failure to muster manpower and secure influences led to the decline and destruction of the state by more aggressive neighbors. Polities that survived or were revived then pursued a more expansionist policy and waged pre-emptive warfare against smaller states and peer competitors. The military means to achieve such strategic goals consisted of a mass of corvée forces that formed the main body. The core of the army consisted of skilled professional units comprising the aristocratic royal elite and foreign adventurer ‘specialist’ mercenaries. Gunpowder weapons became the crucial instruments to maintain tactical superiority on the battlefield and in siege warfare, as well as assuring control over the displaced population. War elephants and cavalry forces operated as shock units to smash and scatter enemy forces in set-piece battles. However, sieges were the majority of military conduct.
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- The Cambridge History of Strategy , pp. 312 - 333Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025