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62 - Human dignity and future generations

from Part VII - Biology and bioethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 March 2015

Marcus Düwell
Affiliation:
Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands
Marcus Düwell
Affiliation:
Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands
Jens Braarvig
Affiliation:
Universitetet i Oslo
Roger Brownsword
Affiliation:
King's College London
Dietmar Mieth
Affiliation:
Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen, Germany
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Summary

The questions of whether we have obligations towards future generations, why we have such obligations and what these obligations entail, are important topics of discussion in contemporary moral and political philosophy. While there seems to be political consensus on the view that we are obligated to adopt a policy of sustainability, the reasons why we should endorse such an obligation are highly contested. The dominant argument can be found in the so-called ‘Brundtland definition’ of ‘sustainable development’: ‘sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (United Nations 1987: 37). In this line of thought, the obligation towards future generations is a normative reason for a sustainable politics. Of course, we also have reasons to act sustainably because of the rights of current (particularly the younger) generations, but various aspects of a sustainable politics are only necessary if we take future generations into account. Such an obligation to a long-term sustainable policy would assume that there is something about future generations that gives us obligations towards them. But if we attribute rights to future generations, we would assume that human rights should be attributed to beings that do not and may never exist. This problem is quite extensively discussed in terms of ‘rights of future generations’ or ‘intergenerational justice’ (for example, Grosseries and Meyer 2009; Hiskes 2009) but the concept of human dignity is hardly ever referred to. In the following I will briefly explain (1) the obstacles we are facing if we talk about human dignity in the context of future generations; (2) what such a conceptualization could look like; and (3) what further philosophical and practical issues arise from this.

Why should we talk about human dignity in the context of future generations?

In providing a normative framework for obligations towards future generations we have basically two options.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity
Interdisciplinary Perspectives
, pp. 551 - 558
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2014

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References

Gewirth, A. 1978. Reason and Morality. Chicago University PressGoogle Scholar
Gewirth, A. 1992. ‘Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights’, in Meyer, M. J. and Parent, W. A. (eds.). The Constitution of Rights: Human Dignity and American Values. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 10–28Google Scholar
Gewirth, A. 2001. ‘Human Rights and Future Generations’, in Boylan, M. (ed.), Environmental Ethics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 207–12Google Scholar
Grosseries, A., and Meyer, L. (eds.). 2009. Intergenerational Justice. Oxford University Press
Hiskes, R. P. 2009. The Human Right to a Green Future: Environmental Rights and Intergenerational Justice. Cambridge University PressGoogle Scholar
Margalit, A. 1996. The Decent Society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University PressGoogle Scholar
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Rolston, H. 1988. Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in The Natural World. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University PressGoogle Scholar
Taylor, P. W. 1986. Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics. Princeton University PressGoogle Scholar
United Nations. 1987. Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future

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