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37 - Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Their Hybrids

from Part III. B - The Executive

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2025

By
Steffen Ganghof
Edited by
Richard Bellamy  and
Jeff King
Richard Bellamy
Affiliation:
University College London
Jeff King
Affiliation:
University College London
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Summary

The chapter discusses the comparative constitutional theory of parliamentary and presidential government as well as various hybrids. It suggests that the much-discussed perils of presidentialism, to the extent that they exist, may largely be due to the kind of personalism that results from directly electing a fixed-term president. When the comparative study of executive formats goes beyond the standard trichotomy of parliamentary, presidential, and semi-presidential systems, we can see that the branch-based separation of powers can be analytically and practically separated from executive personalism. Hybrid systems such as “assembly-independent” government in Switzerland or “semi-parliamentary” government in Australia can be understood as efforts to reap the benefits of powers separation while avoiding the perils of executive personalism. Cogent arguments for the direct election of a fixed-term president are hard to find, despite the widespread belief that it is inherently more democratic.

Keywords

presidential governmentparliamentary governmentsemi-presidential governmentsemi-parliamentary governmentassembly-independent governmentbicameralism
Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge Handbook of Constitutional Theory , pp. 640 - 655
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2025

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References

Recommended Reading

Ackerman, B. (2000). The New Separation of Powers. Harvard Law Review, 113 (3), 633–729.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cheibub, J. A. (2006). Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy, New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Constitutional Reform Committee (1992[1848]). Report on the 1848 Draft Constitution of Switzerland. In Lijphart, Arend ed., Parliamentary versus Presidential Government. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 173–174.Google Scholar
Elgie, R. (2011). Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hamilton, A., Madison, J., & Jay, J. (2008 [1787/88]). The Federalist Papers. Edited by L. Goldman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Khaitan, T. (2021). Balancing Accountability and Effectiveness: A Case for Moderated Parliamentarism. Canadian Journal of Comparative and Contemporary Law, 7 (1) 81–155.Google Scholar
Lijphart, A., ed. (1992). Parliamentary versus Presidential Government, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Linz, J., & Valenzuela, A., eds. (1994). The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.Google Scholar
Samuels, D., & Shugart, M. (2010). Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers – How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Shugart, M., & Carey, J. (1992). Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics, New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Strøm, K., Müller, W., & Bergman, T., eds. (2003). Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies, New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Tavits, M. (2009), Presidents with Prime Ministers. Do Direct Elections Matter? New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar

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