Book contents
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
- Cambridge Companions to Law
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Fundamentals
- Part II History
- Part III Central Figures
- 9 Jeremy Bentham and the Origins of Legal Positivism
- 10 John Austin
- 11 The Normative Power of the Factual: Georg Jellinek’s Phenomenological Theory of Reflective Legal Positivism
- 12 Hans Kelsen’s Non-Reductive Positivism
- 13 The Legal Positivism of H. L. A. Hart
- 14 From Savigny to Linguistic Analysis: Legal Positivism through Bobbio’s Eyes
- 15 Joseph Raz’s Approach to Legal Positivism
- 16 Bulygin’s Analytical Legal Positivism
- Part IV Main Tenets
- Part V Normativity and Values
- Part VI Critique
- Index
- References
13 - The Legal Positivism of H. L. A. Hart
from Part III - Central Figures
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 January 2021
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
- Cambridge Companions to Law
- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Contributors
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- Part I Fundamentals
- Part II History
- Part III Central Figures
- 9 Jeremy Bentham and the Origins of Legal Positivism
- 10 John Austin
- 11 The Normative Power of the Factual: Georg Jellinek’s Phenomenological Theory of Reflective Legal Positivism
- 12 Hans Kelsen’s Non-Reductive Positivism
- 13 The Legal Positivism of H. L. A. Hart
- 14 From Savigny to Linguistic Analysis: Legal Positivism through Bobbio’s Eyes
- 15 Joseph Raz’s Approach to Legal Positivism
- 16 Bulygin’s Analytical Legal Positivism
- Part IV Main Tenets
- Part V Normativity and Values
- Part VI Critique
- Index
- References
Summary
Kramer explains how H. L. A. Hart reinvigorated legal positivism by disconnecting it from the command theory of law defended by his predecessors Bentham and Austin; by introducing through his own theory of law some new and fruitful concepts into legal thinking, such as the internal point of view, the distinction between primary and secondary rules, and the idea of a rule of recognition; by clarifying the meaning of and reasons behind the separability of law and morality through considering the many different ways in which law and morality are, or could be, connected; and by introducing the idea of the minimum content of natural law and clarifying the relation between this and the separability of law and morality. Kramer explains: even though a legal system can fulfil its basic function of securing the conditions of civilisation only if it includes rules prohibiting murder, assault, fraud, etc., the relevant protection provided by the legal system against such misconduct need not be extended to all groups of citizens. Consequently, because no true moral principles would permit this, Hart’s account does not reveal any necessary connections between those principles and legal norms.
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- The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism , pp. 301 - 324Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021