Book contents
- African Interventions
- African Interventions
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 Context and Issues of International Military Intervention
- 2 Non-colonial Military Interventions in Africa
- 3 Military Intervention by Former Colonial Powers in Africa
- 4 Intra-African Hostile Military Intervention
- 5 Intra-African Supportive Military Intervention
- 6 African Intervention into Failed States
- Conclusion
- Appendices
- Notes
- References
- Index
6 - African Intervention into Failed States
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 October 2021
- African Interventions
- African Interventions
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- 1 Context and Issues of International Military Intervention
- 2 Non-colonial Military Interventions in Africa
- 3 Military Intervention by Former Colonial Powers in Africa
- 4 Intra-African Hostile Military Intervention
- 5 Intra-African Supportive Military Intervention
- 6 African Intervention into Failed States
- Conclusion
- Appendices
- Notes
- References
- Index
Summary
States usually intervene in failed states for broader strategic or humanitarian motives. However, chapter 6 uses Somalia, the Democratic Repblic of Congo (DRC), and South Sudan to show that most African interveners lent their support to one side or the other in these lawless lands in the pursuit of their own interests. In the DRC, external interveners were primarily interested in looting rather than in Congo’s stability. In Somalia, Ethiopia switched from hostile to supportive military interventions in an attempt to dampen Islamist influence while also creating a weak transitional government it could easily manipulate. Kenya and Eritrea, in contrast, intervened in order to establish a strong Somali state capable of counterbalancing Ethiopia’s hegemonic aspirations in the horn of Africa. Unlike the first two cases, South Sudan did not experience multiple military interventions despite encountering similar conditions. This negative case is the result of Ethiopia’s restraint from taking any military action to support its kin, the Nuer, because it feared upsetting the ethnic balance in its eastern region. Results from qualitative comparative analysis show that most African interveners are motivated to dispatch their militaries to failed states by the presence of prominent roles, rebel sanctuaries, lootable resources, and domestic pressures.
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- African InterventionsState Militaries, Foreign Powers, and Rebel Forces, pp. 228 - 257Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021