An impressive corpus of legal literature has accumulated in the last few years on the question whether it is possible or desirable to have an arbitral award enforced under the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards1 despite the award's having been annulled in the State where it was made. The issue is important not only in the context of the New York Convention, which itself is the most widely used vehicle of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards,2 but also in the context of other international documents3 or national law provisions modelled on the Convention4 and bilateral treaties that incorporate it by reference.5 The debate has largely centred on two well-known cases, Hilmarton and Chromalloy. It is the purpose of this article to analyse those cases and other relevant case law and offer a comprehensive analysis of the relevance of judicial decisions of the State of origin for purposes of enforcement under the New York Convention. In doing so this article proposes to discuss both the technical aspects of the relevant provisions of the Convention, and in particular their interrelationship, and the issues of legal policy that arise. Though the discussion will touch upon the wider doctrinal question of the degree of independence of arbitral proceedings from the law of the arbitral situs.

There are numerous publications on the interpretation of Article 30 of the EC Treaty by the European Court of Justice1 which for the last 20 years has been one of the most controversial issues in EC law. It is, however, surprising that there is much older, yet strikingly similar, case law of the US Supreme Court which has remained almost unnoticed in Europe. In this article the respective case law of the two courts will be compared. Such a comparison is not only of interest as such, but can also contribute to the discussion about the correct scope of Article 30—which has certainly not yet been exhausted.

The restoration of the pre-war property fights of displaced persons and refugees is critical to restore the peace.

This is particularly true for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The devastating impact of the war which ravaged Bosnia from 1992 until 1995 has left a third of the housing stock destroyed or otherwise uninhabitable. The systematic practice of ethnic cleansing forced Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs to seek shelter in areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina where their ethnic group was in the majority or to seek refuge abroad.1 More than half the 4.5 million the pre-war population of Bosnia and Herzegovina fled their homes in search of safety during the course of the war. According to recent estimates from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, over 800,000 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina are still abroad today.2 Within Bosnia and Herzegovina, more than 800,000 people remain displaced from their pre-conflict homes.3

In December 1995 Eritrean and Yemeni armed forces clashed in one of the islands situated off the coast of these two States in the Red Sea (Greater Hanish1). Behind the incident was a dispute concerning, inter alia, the territorial sovereignty over several uninhabited islands in the area, the definition of the maritime boundary between the two States and the use of the waters surrounding the islands by fishermen of both States.2 Undoubtedly, this dispute is deeply rooted in the history of the two States, and their peoples.

The margin of appreciation doctrine has become a fundamental part of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. It has played a central role in most of the cases decided by that Court, including many of its most significant and controversial, and until recently has been the subject of remarkably little analysis. However, there has been a spate of interest in the doctrine in the last year or so.1 Most of this debate has concerned the details of how the margin of appreciation operates in the context of particular articles of the European Convention on Human Rights. This article's purpose is to look at the wider picture. After an outline of the essential characteristics of the doctrine, I will examine the nature of the margin and its role in adjudication. I will suggest that there are logical flaws in the margin as currently conceived, and that these undermine the quality and coherence of the Court's judgments.

The general principle, best articulated in the leading case of British South Africa Company v. Companhia de Mocambique,1 is that a court in the Commonwealth will not entertain an action involving the title to foreign realty. However, there are two established exceptions. First, a court of equity will not refuse jurisdiction if the plaintiff's claim is based on contract, trust or fraud affecting the foreign land, and the court has jurisdiction in personam over the defendant.2In personam jurisdiction may be established if the defendant is present within the jurisdiction, submits to the court, or the court grants leave to serve notice of the writ out of the jurisdiction under Order 11, rule 1(1) (or its equivalent) of the Rules of the Supreme Court. Second, “in the exercise of the undoubted jurisdiction of the courts it may become necessary incidentally to investigate and determine the title to foreign lands”.3 Thus, if the court has jurisdiction to administer a trust or the estate of a deceased person, and the property includes property (whether movables or immovables) situated locally, and immovables situated abroad, the court will have jurisdiction to determine questions of title to the foreign immovables for the purposes of the administration.4 No contractual or fiduciary relationship need exist between the parties, and it seems unlikely that in personam jurisdiction is required.5

The conclusion and adoption of the Statute of a permanent International Criminal Court2 (“Statute”) in Rome in July 19983 represent a turning point in the enforcement of legal norms regulating armed conflict. Th e Rom e Conference was the latest, and most important, chapter in a long saga concerning the broader issue of the conclusion and adoption of a Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, an important part of which was the establishment of an international criminal court to try such crimes.4 The International Law Commission (ILC), the UN organ responsible for the preparation of the Code,5 decided to separate the two objectives and to proceed with the drafting of a statute for an international criminal court that was distinct from the Draft Code of Crimes: the ILC envisaged a court that would exercise jurisdiction in respect of crimes of international concern which existed as such in various treaties already in force.6 This approach is reflected in the provisions of the Statute adopted at Rom e concerning the jurisdiction of the Court, as explained below.7

When the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice was drafted by an Advisory Committee of Jurists in 1920, a paramount question was, should a judge of the nationality of a State party to the case sit?

The sensitivity of the issue was encapsulated by a report of a committee of the Court in 1927 on the occasion of a revision of the Rules of Court. It observed that: “In the attempt to establish international courts of justice, the fundamental problem always has been, and probably always will be, that of the representation of the litigants in the constitution of the tribunal. Of all influences to which men are subject, none is more powerful, more pervasive, or more subtle, than the tie of allegiance that binds them to the land of their homes and kindred and to the great sources of the honours and preferments for which they are so ready to spend their fortunes and to risk their lives. This fact, known to all the world, the [Court's] Statute frankly recognises and deals with.”1

My starting point for this discussion of the relationship between treaties and soft law is the observation that the subtlety of the processes by which contemporary international law can be created is no longer adequately captured by reference to the orthodox categories of custom and treaty. The role of soft law as an element in international law-making is now widely appreciated, and its influence throughout international law is evident. Within that law-making process the relationships between treaty and custom, or between soft law and custom are also well understood. The relationship between treaties and soft law is less often explored, but it is no less important, and has great practical relevance to the work of international organisations.

This article explores briefly the relation between aboriginal rights and sustainable development in Canada, using as a vehicle for discussion the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia.1 This case involved claims by the Houses of Gitksan and Wet'suwet'en, comprising some 6,000 to 7,000 persons, to aboriginal title over separate portions of approximately 58,000 square kilometres of land in the interior of British Columbia. The territory is a rich agricultural area with vast forests and abundant wildlife.

Three main tasks can be identified for comparative law. The first is to investigate differences between legal systems and, in particular, to distinguish between “real” differences, where the outcomes of the application of principles diverge between legal systems, and “superficial” differences, where similar outcomes are masked by the conceptual structures of the relevant systems. The second is to trace developments in the relationships between legal systems and thus to explore tendencies of convergence or divergence (in terms of “real” differences), noting that in some areas convergence may be required under international legal instruments. The third task is to explain and to evaluate such developments: why do systems converge or diverge? Is convergence desirable or undesirable?

Against a background of increasingly intense legal harmonisation and with the prospects of Central European accession to the EU drawing ever closer, a recent decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, Dec.30/1998 (VI.25) AB1 has highlighted the constitutional implications of applying EC law in the domestic system of an associate state. The judgment itself concerned the constitutionality of the competition provisions of the EC-Hungary Europe Agreement (“EA”) together with Decision 2/96 of the Association Council on the relevant Implementing Rules (“IR”). While the Hungarian court is not the first of its type in an associate state to deal with the effect internally of an Association Agreement,2 nevertheless its decision offers certain insights into the judicial response to the integration process in Central Europe.

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS—“the Tribunal”) heard its first case at the end of 1997.1 A remarkable split judgment, which saw both the President and Vice-President of the Tribunal joining the minority judges in recording persuasive dissenting judgments, struck a harsh and discordant note, regrettable in what should have been an auspicious debut.

The 1985 European Communities Directive on Product Liability1 aims to harmonise member State product liability rules and to improve the level of protection of victims by basing the liability of producers for physical injury and damage to personal goods on the proof that the victim's damage was caused by a defect in the product supplied. On 19 May 1998, ten years after the deadline for transposition, France finally enacted legislation incorporating the Directive into national law.2 The Directive was incorporated into English law by Part I of the Consumer Protection Act 1987.

If a defendazCnt to legal proceedings conceals or dissipates his assets before a judgment is given, the execution of the ensuing judgment may become impossible. To preserve the possibility that a future judgment will be executed, both English and Japanese courts have power to grant interim relief freezing a defendant's assets. As is well known, this is achieved in England by the Mareva injunction, which is now called simply “freezing injunction” with the implementation of the new Civil Procedure Rules. In Japan, it is the kari-sashiosae order available under the Civil Interim Relief Law (Minji Hozen Ho)1 which serves this purpose.

At the centre of the international trading order, under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), lies a dispute-settlement system. This system offers a graduated conflict-resolution mechanism that begins with a consultation process; progresses to adjudication, through a panel system, and ends in an appellate process.1 Under this machinery, in October 1996 India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand (the complainants) requested joint consultations with the United States, regarding the US prohibition on the importation of certain shrimps and shrimp products caught with fishing technology considered by the United States adversely to affect the population of sea turtles—an endangered species under CITES.2 The US prohibition arose from section 609 of Public Law 101–1623 and associated regulations and judicial rulings (hereafter referred to as section 609). In a nutshell the complainants claimed denial of market access to their exports, and the United States justified this on grounds of conservation. However, as a consequence of the failure of the consultations, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel, around April 1997, to consider a joint complaint against the United States in relation to section 609. Australia, Ecuador, the European Communities, HongKong, China, Mexico and Nigeria joined the complainants as third parties. In May 1998 the panel's report was published, containing a decision in favour of the complainants. In July 1998 the United States appealed to the WTO Appellate Body, and in October 1998 the Appellate Body issued its report.4

It is generally accepted that, in actions in personam, the foundation of the court's jurisdiction at common law is the service of process.1 To this extent the rules as to service define the limits of the court's jurisdiction. So, for a claimant to establish the jurisdiction of the English court over an overseas company2 he must be able to serve process on the company in accordance with the rules of service. The general rule is that an overseas company, like an individual, may be served with process in England if present within the jurisdiction.3 However, since a company is only a legal (not natural) person, it cannot be present in the same way as an individual. It has therefore been necessary for special rules to be laid down by which it can be determined whether or not an overseas company is present in England and therefore may be served with process here. Before 1992 those rules were contained in sections 691 and 695 of the Companies Act 19854 (the pre-1992 regime). However, in 1992 the law was amended and a separate provision was laid down in section 694A of the Companies Act 1985 to regulate the service of process on any overseas company with a branch in Great Britain (the 1992 regime).