Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 January 2008
At the centre of the international trading order, under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), lies a dispute-settlement system. This system offers a graduated conflict-resolution mechanism that begins with a consultation process; progresses to adjudication, through a panel system, and ends in an appellate process.1 Under this machinery, in October 1996 India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand (the complainants) requested joint consultations with the United States, regarding the US prohibition on the importation of certain shrimps and shrimp products caught with fishing technology considered by the United States adversely to affect the population of sea turtles—an endangered species under CITES.2 The US prohibition arose from section 609 of Public Law 101–1623 and associated regulations and judicial rulings (hereafter referred to as section 609). In a nutshell the complainants claimed denial of market access to their exports, and the United States justified this on grounds of conservation. However, as a consequence of the failure of the consultations, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel, around April 1997, to consider a joint complaint against the United States in relation to section 609. Australia, Ecuador, the European Communities, HongKong, China, Mexico and Nigeria joined the complainants as third parties. In May 1998 the panel's report was published, containing a decision in favour of the complainants. In July 1998 the United States appealed to the WTO Appellate Body, and in October 1998 the Appellate Body issued its report.4
1. On the World Trade Organization, see e.g. Jackson, J., The World Trading System (1997)Google Scholar; Qureshi, A. H., The World Trade Organization (1996).Google Scholar
2. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (1973) 12 I.L.M. 1085.Google Scholar
3. 16 United States Code, para.1537.
4. United Slates—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Report of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body, WT/DS58/AB/R. Available from www.wto.org.
5. WT/D S48/R. The panel report extends to some 424 pages.
6. Centre for Marine Conservation, the Centre for International Environmental Law and the World Wide Fund for Nature.
7. See panel report, para.3.131.
8. Idem, para.7.16.
9. Idem, para.7.49.
10. Idem, paras.7.52 and 7.61.
11. The submissions were from (1) the Earth Island Institute, the Humane Society of the United States and the Sierra Club; (2) the Centre for International Environmental Law, the Centre for Marine Conservation, the Environmental Foundation Ltd, the Mangrove Action Project, the Philippine Ecological Network, Red National de Accion Ecologica and Sobrevivencia; and (3) the World Wide Fund for Nature and the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development.
12. Paras.83 and 88 of the Appellate Body report.
13. Idem, para.108.
14. Art.13 of the Understanding and para.104 of the Appellate Body report.
15. Para.109 of the Appellate Body report.
16. See United States—Gasoline Appellate Body report (1996), WT/DS2/AB/R, p.22.Google Scholar
17. Para.118 of the Appellate Body report.
18. Idem, para.115.
19. Idem, para.134.
20. Idem, para.133.
21. Idem, para.152.
22. Idem, para.163.
23. Idem, para.165.
24. Ibid.
25. I.e. India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand.
26. Para.167 of the Appellate Body report.
27. Idem, para.168.
28. E.g. Principle 21 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, Art.5 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.
29. para.177 of the Appellate Body report.
30. Panel Report on United States—Restrictions on Import of Tuna (1991), DS21/R (unadopted)Google Scholar; Panel Report on United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 16 06 1994, DS29/R (unadopted).Google Scholar
31. See e.g. para.7.46 of the US Shrimps case panel report.
32. For an examination of those cases see e.g. Charnovitz, S., “The Moral Exception in Trade Policy” (1997–1998) 38 Virginia J.I.L. 689.Google Scholar
33. Supra n 3O.
34. Under GATT 1947 a party to a dispute could block the adoption of a report by the GATT contracting parties. This meant that the report was not binding on the parties. Under the WTO system this is no longer the case.
35. Panel report, para.7.51.
36. Para.133 of the Appellate Body report.
37. Idem, para.156.
38. Idem, para.155.
39. Idem, para.159.
40. See idem, paras.135 and 174, and e.g. para.7.57 of the panel report.
41. Para.158 of the Appellate Body report.
42. Idem, para.165.
43. Idem, para.163.
44. Idem, para.166.
45. Idem, para.168.
46. Idem, para.31.
47. Art.13(1).
48. Para.31 of the Appellate Body report.
49. Art.10(2) of the Understanding.
50. Idem, Appendix 3.
51. Idem, Art.10(2).
52. Paras.32 and 33 of the Appellate Body report.
53. Para.10 of the Working Procedures, supra n. 50, provides for the presentations, rebuttals and statements of the parties to be made in the presence of the parties.
54. See Art.IX of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO.