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Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis To Comparative Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2008

Anthony Ogus
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Extract

Three main tasks can be identified for comparative law. The first is to investigate differences between legal systems and, in particular, to distinguish between “real” differences, where the outcomes of the application of principles diverge between legal systems, and “superficial” differences, where similar outcomes are masked by the conceptual structures of the relevant systems. The second is to trace developments in the relationships between legal systems and thus to explore tendencies of convergence or divergence (in terms of “real” differences), noting that in some areas convergence may be required under international legal instruments. The third task is to explain and to evaluate such developments: why do systems converge or diverge? Is convergence desirable or undesirable?

Type
Shorter Articles, Comments and Notes
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 48 , Issue 2 , April 1999 , pp. 405 - 418
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 1999

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