Cannabis use and familial vulnerability to psychosis have been associated with social cognition deficits. This study examined the potential relationship between cannabis use and cognitive biases underlying social cognition and functioning in patients with first episode psychosis (FEP), their siblings, and controls.

We analyzed a sample of 543 participants with FEP, 203 siblings, and 1168 controls from the EU-GEI study using a correlational design. We used logistic regression analyses to examine the influence of clinical group, lifetime cannabis use frequency, and potency of cannabis use on cognitive biases, accounting for demographic and cognitive variables.

FEP patients showed increased odds of facial recognition processing (FRP) deficits (OR = 1.642, CI 1.123–2.402) relative to controls but not of speech illusions (SI) or jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias, with no statistically significant differences relative to siblings. Daily and occasional lifetime cannabis use were associated with decreased odds of SI (OR = 0.605, CI 0.368–0.997 and OR = 0.646, CI 0.457–0.913 respectively) and JTC bias (OR = 0.625, CI 0.422–0.925 and OR = 0.602, CI 0.460–0.787 respectively) compared with lifetime abstinence, but not with FRP deficits, in the whole sample. Within the cannabis user group, low-potency cannabis use was associated with increased odds of SI (OR = 1.829, CI 1.297–2.578, FRP deficits (OR = 1.393, CI 1.031–1.882, and JTC (OR = 1.661, CI 1.271–2.171) relative to high-potency cannabis use, with comparable effects in the three clinical groups.

Our findings suggest increased odds of cognitive biases in FEP patients who have never used cannabis and in low-potency users. Future studies should elucidate this association and its potential implications.

This study attempted to replicate whether a bias in probabilistic reasoning, or ‘jumping to conclusions’(JTC) bias is associated with being a sibling of a patient with schizophrenia spectrum disorder; and if so, whether this association is contingent on subthreshold delusional ideation.

Data were derived from the EUGEI project, a 25-centre, 15-country effort to study psychosis spectrum disorder. The current analyses included 1261 patients with schizophrenia spectrum disorder, 1282 siblings of patients and 1525 healthy comparison subjects, recruited in Spain (five centres), Turkey (three centres) and Serbia (one centre). The beads task was used to assess JTC bias. Lifetime experience of delusional ideation and hallucinatory experiences was assessed using the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences. General cognitive abilities were taken into account in the analyses.

JTC bias was positively associated not only with patient status but also with sibling status [adjusted relative risk (aRR) ratio : 4.23 CI 95% 3.46–5.17 for siblings and aRR: 5.07 CI 95% 4.13–6.23 for patients]. The association between JTC bias and sibling status was stronger in those with higher levels of delusional ideation (aRR interaction in siblings: 3.77 CI 95% 1.67–8.51, and in patients: 2.15 CI 95% 0.94–4.92). The association between JTC bias and sibling status was not stronger in those with higher levels of hallucinatory experiences.

These findings replicate earlier findings that JTC bias is associated with familial liability for psychosis and that this is contingent on the degree of delusional ideation but not hallucinations.

The ‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) bias is associated with both psychosis and general cognition but their relationship is unclear. In this study, we set out to clarify the relationship between the JTC bias, IQ, psychosis and polygenic liability to schizophrenia and IQ.

A total of 817 first episode psychosis patients and 1294 population-based controls completed assessments of general intelligence (IQ), and JTC, and provided blood or saliva samples from which we extracted DNA and computed polygenic risk scores for IQ and schizophrenia.

The estimated proportion of the total effect of case/control differences on JTC mediated by IQ was 79%. Schizophrenia polygenic risk score was non-significantly associated with a higher number of beads drawn (B = 0.47, 95% CI −0.21 to 1.16, p = 0.17); whereas IQ PRS (B = 0.51, 95% CI 0.25–0.76, p < 0.001) significantly predicted the number of beads drawn, and was thus associated with reduced JTC bias. The JTC was more strongly associated with the higher level of psychotic-like experiences (PLEs) in controls, including after controlling for IQ (B = −1.7, 95% CI −2.8 to −0.5, p = 0.006), but did not relate to delusions in patients.

Our findings suggest that the JTC reasoning bias in psychosis might not be a specific cognitive deficit but rather a manifestation or consequence, of general cognitive impairment. Whereas, in the general population, the JTC bias is related to PLEs, independent of IQ. The work has the potential to inform interventions targeting cognitive biases in early psychosis.

Contemporary models of psychosis implicate the importance of affective dysregulation and cognitive factors (e.g. biases and schemas) in the development and maintenance of psychotic symptoms, but studies testing proposed mechanisms remain limited. This study, uniquely using a prospective design, investigated whether the jumping to conclusions (JTC) reasoning bias contributes to psychosis progression and persistence.

Data were derived from the second Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence Study (NEMESIS-2). The Composite International Diagnostic Interview and an add-on instrument were used to assess affective dysregulation (i.e. depression, anxiety and mania) and psychotic experiences (PEs), respectively. The beads task was used to assess JTC bias. Time series analyses were conducted using data from T1 and T2 (N = 8666), excluding individuals who reported high psychosis levels at T0.

Although the prospective design resulted in low statistical power, the findings suggest that, compared to those without symptoms, individuals with lifetime affective dysregulation were more likely to progress from low/moderate psychosis levels (state of ‘aberrant salience’, one or two PEs) at T1 to high psychosis levels (‘frank psychosis’, three or more PEs or psychosis-related help-seeking behaviour) at T2 if the JTC bias was present [adj. relative risk ratio (RRR): 3.8, 95% confidence interval (CI) 0.8–18.6, p = 0.101]. Similarly, the JTC bias contributed to the persistence of high psychosis levels (adj. RRR: 12.7, 95% CI 0.7–239.6, p = 0.091).

We found some evidence that the JTC bias may contribute to psychosis progression and persistence in individuals with affective dysregulation. However, well-powered prospective studies are needed to replicate these findings.

Jumping to conclusions (JTC), which is the proneness to require less information before forming beliefs or making a decision, has been related to formation and maintenance of delusions. Using data from the National Institute of Health Research Biomedical Research Centre Genetics and Psychosis (GAP) case–control study of first-episode psychosis (FEP), we set out to test whether the presence of JTC would predict poor clinical outcome at 4 years.

One-hundred and twenty-three FEP patients were assessed with the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS), Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) and the probabilistic reasoning ‘Beads’ Task at the time of recruitment. The sample was split into two groups based on the presence of JTC bias. Follow-up data over an average of 4 years were obtained concerning clinical course and outcomes (remission, intervention of police, use of involuntary treatment – the Mental Health Act (MHA) – and inpatient days).

FEP who presented JTC at baseline were more likely during the follow-up period to be detained under the MHA [adjusted OR 15.62, 95% confidence interval (CI) 2.92–83.54, p = 0.001], require intervention by the police (adjusted OR 14.95, 95% CI 2.68–83.34, p = 0.002) and have longer admissions (adjusted IRR = 5.03, 95% CI 1.91–13.24, p = 0.001). These associations were not accounted for by socio-demographic variables, IQ and symptom dimensions.

JTC in FEP is associated with poorer outcome as indicated and defined by more compulsion police intervention and longer periods of admission. Our findings raise the question of whether the implementation of specific interventions to reduce JTC, such as Metacognition Training, may be a useful addition in early psychosis intervention programmes.

The jumping to conclusions (JTC) reasoning bias and decreased working memory performance (WMP) are associated with psychosis, but associations with affective disturbances (i.e. depression, anxiety, mania) remain inconclusive. Recent findings also suggest a transdiagnostic phenotype of co-occurring affective disturbances and psychotic experiences (PEs). This study investigated whether JTC bias and decreased WMP are associated with co-occurring affective disturbances and PEs.

Data were derived from the second Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence Study (NEMESIS-2). Trained interviewers administered the Composite International Diagnostic Interview (CIDI) at three time points in a general population sample (N = 4618). The beads and digit-span task were completed to assess JTC bias and WMP, respectively. CIDI was used to measure affective disturbances and an add-on instrument to measure PEs.

Compared to individuals with neither affective disturbances nor PEs, the JTC bias was more likely to occur in individuals with co-occurring affective disturbances and PEs [moderate psychosis (1–2 PEs): adjusted relative risk ratio (RRR) 1.17, 95% CI 0.98–1.41; and high psychosis (3 or more PEs or psychosis-related help-seeking behaviour): adjusted RRR 1.57, 95% CI 1.19–2.08], but not with affective disturbances and PEs alone, whereas decreased WMP was more likely in all groups. There was some evidence of a dose–response relationship, as JTC bias and decreased WMP were more likely in individuals with affective disturbances as the level of PEs increased or help-seeking behaviour was reported.

The findings suggest that JTC bias and decreased WMP may contribute to a transdiagnostic phenotype of co-occurring affective disturbances and PEs.

That delusional and delusion-prone individuals ‘jump to conclusions’ is one of the most robust and important findings in the literature on delusions. However, although the notion of ‘jumping to conclusions’ (JTC) implies gathering insufficient evidence and reaching premature decisions, previous studies have not investigated whether the evidence gathering of delusion-prone individuals is, in fact, suboptimal. The standard JTC effect is a relative effect but using relative comparisons to substantiate absolute claims is problematic. In this study we investigated whether delusion-prone participants jump to conclusions in both a relative and an absolute sense.

Healthy participants (n = 112) completed an incentivized probabilistic reasoning task in which correct decisions were rewarded and additional information could be requested for a small price. This combination of rewards and costs generated optimal decision points. Participants also completed measures of delusion proneness, intelligence and risk aversion.

Replicating the standard relative finding, we found that delusion proneness significantly predicted task decisions, such that the more delusion prone the participants were, the earlier they decided. This finding was robust when accounting for the effects of risk aversion and intelligence. Importantly, high-delusion-prone participants also decided in advance of an objective rational optimum, gathering fewer data than would have maximized their expected payoff. Surprisingly, we found that even low-delusion-prone participants jumped to conclusions in this absolute sense.

Our findings support and clarify the claim that delusion formation is associated with a tendency to ‘jump to conclusions’. In short, most people jump to conclusions, but more delusion-prone individuals ‘jump further’.

Cognitive biases, especially jumping to conclusions (JTC), are ascribed a vital role in the pathogenesis of schizophrenia. This study set out to explore motivational factors for JTC using a newly developed paradigm.

Twenty-seven schizophrenia patients and 32 healthy controls were shown 15 classical paintings, divided into three blocks. Four alternative titles (one correct and three lure titles) had to be appraised according to plausibility (0–10). Optionally, participants could decide for one option and reject one or more alternatives. In random order across blocks, anxiety-evoking music, happy music or no music was played in the background.

Patients with schizophrenia, particularly those with delusions, made more decisions than healthy subjects. In line with the liberal acceptance (LA) account of schizophrenia, the decision threshold was significantly lowered in patients relative to controls. Patients were also more prone than healthy controls to making a decision when the distance between the first and second best alternative was close. Furthermore, implausible alternatives were judged as significantly more plausible by patients. Anxiety-evoking music resulted in more decisions in currently deluded patients relative to non-deluded patients and healthy controls.

The results confirm predictions derived from the LA account and assert that schizophrenia patients decide hastily under conditions of continued uncertainty. The fact that mood induction did not exert an overall effect could be due to the explicit nature of the manipulation, which might have evoked strategies to counteract their influence.