In this article, I take on a classic objection to Kant’s arguments in the Antinomy of Pure Reason: that the arguments are question-begging, as they draw illicit inferences from claims about representation to claims about reality. While extant attempts to vindicate Kant try to show that he does not make such inferences, I attempt to vindicate Kant’s arguments in a different way: I show that, given Kant’s philosophical backdrop, the inferences in question are not illicit. This is because the transcendental realists that Kant was arguing against have certain philosophical commitments about the nature of ground which, if true, warrant the inferences that Kant draws. This historical corrective not only allows us to better understand Kant’s own thinking in the Antinomies but it also has important upshots for our understanding of Kant’s transcendental idealism.

The eighteenth-century German rationalist tradition is, broadly speaking, committed to (what I call) ‘the principle of rational cognition’: the grounded must be rationally cognizable from its sufficient ground. Whereas the prevailing view takes the fundamental challenge to rationalist paradise to stem from the principle of sufficient reason, I argue that it instead stems from this principle: How is it possible to rationally cognize anything at all from its ground? By investigating the opposing responses of two of Leibniz’s most influential immediate successors, Christian Wolff and Christian Crusius, we find no easy way to remain in rationalist paradise.

The social world contains institutions (nations, clubs), groups (races, genders), objects (talismans, borders), and more. This essay explores a puzzle about the essences of social items. There is widespread consensus against social essences because of problematic presuppositions often made about them. But it is argued that essence can be freed from these presuppositions and their problems. Even so, a puzzle still arises. In a Platonic spirit, essences in general seem detached from the world. In an Aristotelian spirit, social essences in particular seem embedded in the world. The puzzle is that these inclinations are individually plausible but jointly incompatible. The essay has four aims: to clarify and refine the puzzle; to explore the puzzle's implications for essence in general and for social essences in particular; to illustrate the fruitfulness of the general distinction between detached and embedded; and to develop this distinction to sketch a novel solution to the puzzle.

Many philosophers take purportedly logical cases of ground (such as a true disjunction being grounded in its true disjunct(s)) to be obvious cases, and indeed such cases have been used to motivate the existence of and importance of ground. I argue against this. I do so by motivating two kinds of semantic determination relations. Intuitions of logical ground track these semantic relations. Moreover, our knowledge of semantics for (e.g.) first order logic can explain why we have such intuitions. And, I argue, neither semantic relation can be a species of ground even on a quite broad conception of what ground is. Hence, without a positive argument for taking so-called ‘logical ground’ to be something distinct from a semantic determination relation, we should cease treating logical cases as cases of ground.

In this critical review, I focus on two things. First, I respond to Stang’s interpretation of Descartes, according to which Descartes’ endorsement of his ontological argument commits him to possibilism, the doctrine that there are, or at least could be, non-existent individuals. My response consists in presenting a version of Descartes’ argument the acceptance of which does not require the acceptance of possibilism. The second thing I focus on is Stang’s claim that Kant distinguishes several kinds of real possibility. I raise worries about Stang’s formulations of various doctrines of real possibility, and I preliminarily explore how real essence and ground are connected with the various kinds of real necessity Stang’s Kant recognizes.

Matter’s real essence is a ground for certain features of phenomena. Things in themselves are likewise a ground for certain features of phenomena. How do these claims relate? The former is a causal essentialism about physics, Stang argues; and the features so grounded are phenomenally nomically necessary. The latter involves a distinctive ontology of things in themselves, I argue; but the features so grounded are not noumenally nomically necessary. Stang’s version of Kant’s modal metaphysics is admirable, but does not go far enough. Kant’s causal essentialism involves the essences of fundamental properties, as well as of matter. And things in themselves are grounds, because they are substances, the ‘substrate’ of phenomena.

This article develops the Pure Logic of Iterated Full Ground (plifg), a logic of ground that can deal with claims of the form “ϕ grounds that (ψ grounds θ)”—what we call iterated grounding claims. The core idea is that some truths Γ ground a truth ϕ when there is an explanatory argument (of a certain sort) from premisses Γ to conclusion ϕ. By developing a deductive system that distinguishes between explanatory and nonexplanatory arguments we can give introduction rules for operators for factive and nonfactive full ground, as well as for a propositional “identity” connective. Elimination rules are then found by using a proof-theoretic inversion principle.

This article approaches the relationship between empathy and language, describing the ways in which different dimensions of empathy can be attested in naturally occurring interactional data. The authors adopt the definition of empathy as a multidimensional phenomenon: emotional contagion, as well as the cognitive and affective dimensions of empathy, are all understood to be central to the empathetic process. The article promotes the view that studying the relationship between empathy and language should be grounded in the analysis of real-life interactions. Language evolves in social interaction both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, and is not only an important product but also a means of human sociality. The authors suggest that the best approach for analyzing the empathy–language interface combines the theoretical insights of cognitive grammar with the method of conversation analysis. The paper shows that when empathy is analyzed in natural conversation, we can do sequential and linguistic analysis of the ways in which affect is shown, and through a careful analysis of grammatical devices, offer an explanation of whether the displays of affect are derived from the other person's situation. By analyzing the complex ways in which the interactants orient to the different dimensions of empathy, the paper shows how linguistic analysis can give us concrete tools for forming a deeper understanding of how empathy takes place in real-life encounters.

I argue in favor of a distinctive generic form of essence and ground and show how the two notions thereby complement one another as forms of necessary and sufficient condition.

As speakers, we are frequently called upon to specify the locations of objects and landmarks in our environment. However, despite the considerable body of work on spatial cognition and semantics (i.e. Levinson 1992, 1996, 2003; Tyler and Evans 2003; Herskovits 1986; Vandeloise 1986), there has been almost no research on the expression of location from a multimodal viewpoint: that is, how do speakers use gesture, as well as speech, to express object location? This paper reports on a filmed study of 10 English speakers and 10 French speakers who were asked to express the locations of 28 objects in two spatial scenes. On the basis of our results we argue that a functional, as opposed to a grammatical, approach to the segmentation and analysis of these sorts of expressions is crucial. Such an approach reflects the fact that different Figures (i.e. objects to be located) can exist simultaneously across speech and gesture. Using filmed examples from our data set, we propose a new definition of static locative expressions and outline a multimodal approach for their analysis in oral discourse.

Slippery surfaces are a continuous concern in equine veterinary practice during both treatment and orthopaedic work-ups, especially when horses have to trot on circles. Sliding of the equine foot on the ground with the potential of injury is prevented if the horizontally acting accelerating or decelerating forces on the foot do not exceed maximal friction. Friction can be calculated and therefore anticipated if the coefficient of friction (μ) between the foot of the horse and the particular ground surface is known. Friction between shod and unshod cadaver equine hooves and different ground surfaces (concrete, tarmac and rubber) was determined by pulling the hooves horizontally in a uniform motion. Horizontal forces (Fh) were measured on a force plate and with a portable digital electronic force meter. The coefficient of friction (μ) was calculated as the quotient between Fh and the gravity force (N) of the object, hence: μ = Fh /N. This study has shown that the coefficient of friction between equine hooves and a specific ground surface can be determined using a portable digital force meter or a force plate. Friction significantly depended not only on the type of surface but also on shoeing of the equine foot. Bare feet showed more friction with the hard surfaces (bricks and tarmac), the shod feet showing more friction with the rubber surfaces. Coefficients of friction could be used to estimate the possibility of injuries occurring in the equine industry during exercise and/or lameness or pre-purchase examinations.