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Klaas J. Kraay
Published online:

16 September 2021

Print publication:

14 October 2021
- Element
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Theism is the view that God exists; naturalism is the view that there are no supernatural beings, processes, mechanisms, or forces. This Element explores whether things are better, worse, or neither on theism relative to naturalism. It introduces readers to the central philosophical issues that bear on this question, and it distinguishes a wide range of ways it can be answered. It critically examines four views, three of which hold (in various ways) that things are better on theism than on naturalism, and one of which holds just the opposite.

On How (Not) to Argue for Preferring God’s Non-Existence
KIRK LOUGHEED
Journal:

Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie / Volume 58 / Issue 4 / December 2019

Published online by Cambridge University Press:

29 October 2018, pp. 677-699
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Consider two epistemically possible worlds that are as similar as can be, except that atheism is true in one world and theism is true in the other world. Which world is it rational to prefer? I explore the strongest defence of the somewhat counterintuitive claim that it is rational to prefer the atheistic world. I also discuss the opposite conclusion, namely, that it’s rational to prefer the theistic world. Surprisingly, my conclusion is that it’s difficult to tell whether to prefer theism or atheism overall.

On the Objective Meaningful Life Argument: A Response to Kirk Lougheed
MYRON A. PENNER
Journal:

Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review / Revue canadienne de philosophie / Volume 57 / Issue 1 / March 2018

Published online by Cambridge University Press:

05 December 2017, pp. 173-182
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Kirk Lougheed has argued that the Objective Meaningful Life Argument establishes a type of anti-theism, the view that a theistic God’s existence would make things worse and thus it’s rational to prefer that God not exist. The objective version of this argument is said to be an improvement over my subjective version of the Meaningful Life Argument. I argue that Lougheed’s version fares no better than the subjective version.