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For over two decades, political communication research has hailed the potentially reinvigorating effect of social media on democracy. Social media was expected to provide new opportunities for people to learn about politics and public affairs, and to participate politically. Building on two systematic literature reviews on social media, and its effects on political participation and knowledge (2000–2020), and introducing empirical evidence drawing on four original US survey data that expands for over a decade (2009–2020), this Element contends that social media has only partially fulfilled this tenet, producing a Social Media Democracy Mirage. That is, social media have led to a socio-political paradox in which people are more participatory than ever, yet not necessarily more informed.
This chapter examines evidence for media malaise induced by attack journalism and the mean world and bad news effects. It also considers the effects of violence, advertising and celebrity culture for the spreading of political alienation, distrust and confusion. Once again, the negative effects of the media are small, but there is evidence of a positive effect for political knowledge and engagement.
Political scientists have largely come to a consensus that “most citizens are politically uninformed” (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1997), but even with increased attention to state-level representation and electoral behavior, political scientists know surprisingly little themselves regarding what Americans know about state politics. Past studies of state political knowledge examine narrow domains of knowledge and make few comparisons between individuals’ understanding of national and state politics. To provide a more comprehensive account of Americans’ state political knowledge, I conducted a novel national survey that included over 30 political knowledge questions. In a descriptive and exploratory analysis, I show Americans demonstrated more knowledge about who their Governor is but less knowledge about who represents them in the state legislature, state government institutions, and the state economy, particularly compared to their knowledge of federal politics. The different levels of political knowledge across different domains and levels of government raise concerns for statehouse democracy and should be considered before testing theories at the state level. To guide future research and surveys, I identify political knowledge questions that discriminate well between those who know little, some, and a lot about state politics across different domains of political knowledge.
The contemporary crisis in relation to constitutional literacy relates not to the lack of knowledge that citizens possess about fundamental constitutional texts, but to the considerable lack of development in relation to what constitutional literacy itself entails. This article accordingly unpacks the notion of constitutional literacy: its importance, its characteristics, and its variable nature. Using a comparative lens, the article invites reflection on the role we expect citizens to play in our democracies, and especially the associated knowledge and skills required for successful state performance. We suggest that constitutional literacy is exceptionally multifaceted and fluid in nature, which serves to make its conceptualization and measurement challenging endeavours, and certainly more so than the easy invocation of this notion may assume at first blush. In this regard, engaging with the constitutional text, while an integral component of constitutional literacy, is ultimately only one part of the puzzle.
A burgeoning literature studies compulsory voting and its effects on turnout, but we know very little about how compulsory voting works in practice. In this Element, the authors fill this gap by providing an in-depth discussion of compulsory voting rules and their enforcement in Australia, Belgium, and Brazil. By analysing comparable public opinion data from these three countries, they shed light on citizens' attitudes toward compulsory voting. The Element examines citizens' perceptions, their knowledge of the system, and whether they support it. The authors connect this with information on citizens' reported turnout and vote choice to assess who is affected by mandatory voting and why. The work clarifies that there is no single system of compulsory voting. Each country has its own set of rules, and most voters are unaware of how they are enforced.
The article addresses ongoing debates in the study of political knowledge and voting behavior. The article identifies significant divergences in previous work which may explain why such debates persist, including in the measurement of political knowledge and the inclusion of confounding variables. The article remedies these issues in an observational study examining how political knowledge affects the impact of spatial considerations and cognitive shortcuts on the vote. The article also contributes the first randomized experiment on this research question in the literature. Using the framework of conjoint analysis, the experiment evaluates how political knowledge affects the impact of spatial considerations and cognitive shortcuts on the vote. The article hypothesizes that political knowledge will increase the impact of spatial considerations on the vote but will not modify the impact of cognitive shortcuts. This expectation is supported in both the observational and experimental results.
Data systematically depict women as less knowledgeable, interested, and apt to provide a valid answer to questions about politics. These three gaps – the knowledge, the political interest, and the expression of knowledge gap – are related to a discriminatory way of measuring political knowledge and interest, which conceptually juxtaposes the more general concept of knowledge and interest in politics to that of knowing about, or taking an interest in, political institutions. This narrows the measurement to topics that men are more interested in. In this experimental study, the focus is shifted from political institutions to a wider understanding of what can be a political issue. It reveals that women's knowledge disadvantage and hesitancy in answering to knowledge questions, together with men's higher levels of interest, are most likely conditional to this traditional interpretation of the term politics.
This study examines the relationship between ideology and resistance to the government's apology to Asian victims of Japan's colonial rule policy, which varies according to political knowledge. Based on existing research, because only a limited percentage of voters consider politics to be ideology based, it is expected that the association between ideology and resistance to intergroup apologies by one's own government differs according to their level of political knowledge. We selected three issues of political apologies: colonial rule in Asian countries, comfort women, and the massacre of Korean people based on false rumors at the time of the 1923 Kanto Earthquake; thereafter, we conducted an online survey of a panel selected by Nikkei Research Inc. The results suggest that the relationship between ideology and resistance among voters to political apologies varies with the level of political knowledge, as expected. On the contrary, social dominance orientations (SDO) were associated with resistance to apology, regardless of their level of political knowledge. We then tested the reproducibility of this finding by conducting a follow-up test on registered users of a crowdsourcing service after conducting a preregistration. In addition, we also measured general attitudes toward personal apologies and neighboring countries victimized by Japan's colonialist policies as factors that might predict resistance to apologies even among the politically uninformed. The association between ideology, SDO, and resistance to governmental apologies was generally replicated in this study.
One of the most fundamental challenges to democratic education is the “epistocratic” challenge. According to proponents of epistocracy, the ordinary citizenry is too stupid, irrational, and demotivated to vote intelligently and better-quality government would result if the franchise were restricted to a small elite of the best informed, most rational, and best-motivated citizens. If correct, epistocracy would imply that many of the ideals of democratic education are misplaced and that the educational practice of preparing all citizens to vote would be pointless. In this chapter, I review the theory of epistocracy as it is presented in the work of historical and contemporary philosophers from Plato and John Stuart Mill to Bryan Caplan and – most notably – Jason Brennan. I also discuss the implications of epistocracy for democratic education. I hold that, even if Brennan is right that the franchise should be restricted to a small cognitive elite, the question of how one should educate that elite becomes even more important. In the final analysis, I hold that Brennan’s scheme for ensuring that the cognitive elite is representative of society will require a broadening of political education opportunities that will result in a reintroduction of a democratic form of education through the epistocratic back door.
The gender gap in political knowledge is a well-established finding in Political Science. One explanation for gender differences in political knowledge is the activation of negative stereotypes about women. As part of the Systematizing Confidence in Open Research and Evidence (SCORE) program, we conducted a two-stage preregistered and high-powered direct replication of Study 2 of Ihme and Tausendpfund (2018). While we successfully replicated the gender gap in political knowledge – such that male participants performed better than female participants – both the first (N = 671) and second stage (N = 831) of the replication of the stereotype activation effect were unsuccessful. Taken together (pooled N = 1,502), results indicate evidence of absence of the effect of stereotype activation on gender differences in political knowledge. We discuss potential explanations for these findings and put forward evidence that the gender gap in political knowledge might be an artifact of how knowledge is measured.
In this note, we provide direct evidence of cheating in online assessments of political knowledge. We combine survey responses with web tracking data of a German and a US online panel to assess whether people turn to external sources for answers. We observe item-level prevalence rates of cheating that range from 0 to 12 percent depending on question type and difficulty, and find that 23 percent of respondents engage in cheating at least once across waves. In the US panel, which employed a commitment pledge, we observe cheating behavior among less than 1 percent of respondents. We find robust respondent- and item-level characteristics associated with cheating. However, item-level instances of cheating are rare events; as such, they are difficult to predict and correct for without tracking data. Even so, our analyses comparing naive and cheating-corrected measures of political knowledge provide evidence that cheating does not substantially distort inferences.
Next, Chapter 7 extends our analysis of the public’s response to open deliberation within legislatures using standard survey questions from the CES. We begin by showing that citizens in states with open meetings laws are more likely to respond to a state legislative political knowledge question with a “don’t know” response. Additionally, those in open meetings states who provide a substantive response are less likely to know the correct answer compared to citizens in states with closed meetings who answer substantively. We then demonstrate that among those who identify with the party controlling the legislature, open meetings are associated with an increase in state legislative approval. Thus, this chapter (and the previous one) paint a picture of a public in transparency states that approves of its legislature, but does not actually know more about it. The key information link that represents the mechanism of our proposed theory is missing. This finding helps explain why representative behavior does not change in the wake of transparency reforms; the public does not engage with new information provided by these reforms enough to motivate adaptation by legislators.
A rich literature documents the effects of survey interviewer race on respondents’ answers to questions about political issues and factual knowledge. In this paper, we advance the study of interviewer effects in two ways. First, we examine the impact of race on interviewers’ subjective evaluations of respondents’ political knowledge. Second, we substitute measures of respondent/interviewer racial self-identification with interviewer perceptions of respondent skin tone. We find that white interviewers subjectively rate black respondents’ knowledge lower than do black interviewers, even controlling for objective knowledge measures. Moreover, we identify a negative relationship between relative skin tone and interviewer's assessment of knowledge. Subsequent analyses show a linear relationship between subjective knowledge assessments and the difference between respondent and interviewer skin tone. We conclude with a discussion of the impact of colorism on survey administration and the measurement of political attitudes and democratic capabilities.
Under what conditions are people most likely to discuss politics? Our focus in Chapter 5 is on the moment of decision itself (Stage 2). We use three novel approaches to answer this question. The True Counterfactual Study asked participants to reflect upon and describe either political discussions in which they had recently engaged or political discussions in which they could have engaged, but chose to avoid. Comparing these descriptions revealed that avoided discussions had larger groups with more disagreement. We then used vignette experiments to manipulate various features of a conversation, finding that individuals were more likely to avoid a discussion if they were in the political minority, less knowledgeable than the others, or conversing with weak social ties. The Name Your Price studies asked people to report how much they would need to be paid to discuss various topics with different groups. Individuals demand more compensation to discuss both political and nonpolitical topics with those who disagree, especially when that disagreement is defined in terms of partisan identity.
The primary topic of our chapter is the need for possible theoretical foundations of, and empirical approaches to, a developmental science of politics. We demonstrate the utility of studying political socialisation surrounding presidential elections by describing the results of a large study of US elementary-school-age children’s views of the 2016 US presidential election. We review some potential sources of influence on children's political knowledge and attitudes, highlighting the role of gender, and we speculate about the beliefs that children may have internalised from watching the 2016 election. Finally, we argue that US institutions and parents should strive to improve children's political socialisation by, for example, providing youth with environments that are rich in information related to the purpose and value of politics, and ripe with opportunities and encouragement for political thought and action.
A voluminous literature documents that citizens' perceptions of democracy are shaped by electoral victories and defeats, but what reasoning do citizens use to evaluate parties as winners or losers? Drawing on research on partisan-motivated reasoning, I propose an own-party bias in winner–loser evaluations according to which voters evaluate the electoral fate of their party more favourably than that of other parties. Data gathered in the aftermath of the Danish parliamentary election in 2015 support this expectation. Citizens are more inclined to interpret the election outcome as successful for their preferred party, regardless of the actual election result. This is more pronounced the stronger their partisan attachment and among the less politically knowledgeable, who also assign less importance to objective indicators of electoral success. The findings have implications for our understanding of electoral winners and losers and of how electoral results shape party support and polarization.
Social policy research examining citizens’ welfare knowledge, which offers a gateway to their understanding of the policy context, has remained limited. Adapting the opportunity–motivation–ability framework borrowed from the literature on political knowledge to welfare knowledge, this article offers an analysis of new data from a nationwide survey to explore Turkish society’s knowledge of the composition of public social spending. Corroborating earlier findings in the literature, the article maintains that most people in Turkey overestimate the relative size of social assistance spending for the poor. However, different from previous findings, the majority and most pensioners are also ill-informed about the rank of public spending on old-age pensions, the most widely used social benefit absorbing the largest share of welfare spending. The article provides evidence of the social division of welfare knowledge in Turkish society based mostly on three opportunity-related variables: city of residence, gender and income.
The story of this chapter is that when it comes to local engagement, the decline of local news affects the political behavior of citizens across the spectrum very similarly. The growing scarcity of reporting about local government has led to growing disengagement among Americans of all stripes.
At a time when political observers worry – justifiably – about the health of the US’ national political institutions, threats to local democratic governance cannot be ignored. The local news media – by providing accurate information to citizens about what is happening in city halls, county governments, school boards, and other local political institutions throughout the country – constitute a vital link in the democratic process. Political representation and government effectiveness thus depend on reinvigorating the local news media and the citizen engagement that goes along with it. It can be done, but without a collective effort by citizens, journalists, and groups committed to strengthening local journalism, the long-term health of American democracy may be in peril.
This chapter provides a thorough empirical account of the connection between local news and political engagement during the last two decades. Drawing on a variety of data sources, we go beyond the existing research to demonstrate that the demise of local newspapers we documented in Chapters 2 and 3 indeed contributes to reductions in political engagement in America’s cities and towns.